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Abstract
Information ﬂow properties, which describe conﬁdentiality requirements, are not generally preserved under behavior
reﬁnement. This article describes a formal framework for reﬁnement relations between nondeterministic probabilistic pro-
cesses that capture sufﬁcient conditions to preserve information ﬂow properties. In particular, it uses information-theoretic
concepts to investigate the reﬁnement of a probabilistic, entropy-based information ﬂow property. The reﬁnement relation
considers the abstract and concrete models as views on the same stochastic process. Probabilistic CSP provides the semantic
basis for this investigation.
© 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Conﬁdentiality requirements on an IT system can be expressed as possibilistic or probabilistic information
ﬂow properties. The latter, as for example proposed by Gray [1], express the fact that an adversary cannot
gain information about certain system behaviors in terms of Shannon’s [2] information theory. The former are
derivatives of Goguen and Meseguer’s [3] noninterference property, e.g. [4,5,6,7,8,9]. These properties abstract
from the stochastic behavior of a system and consider the logically possible behavior of a system only.
The present paper investigates the preservation of information ﬂow properties under reﬁnement. Earlier
work [10] established a formal framework to investigate the conditions of preserving arbitrary information ﬂow
properties. The present article uses that framework for conﬁdentiality-preserving reﬁnement (CPR) to address
the preservation of probabilistic information ﬂow properties.
The following sections informally summarize and motivate the contributions of the present paper.
1.1. Behavior reﬁnement
The paradigm of system and software development by stepwise reﬁnement is a long standing one. Although
rarely practiced rigorously, it provides the formal justiﬁcation for modern software engineering techniques such
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as behavioral subtyping for object-oriented inheritance [11], design by contract [12], and model-driven develop-
ment. In its rigorous form, it has been applied, among others, in safety-critical applications [13].
The general idea of stepwise reﬁnement is to ﬁrst capture the essential requirements on a system in a concise
model, the initial speciﬁcation, that abstracts from all unnecessary detail and leaves room for subsequent design
decisions. In a reﬁnement step, two models, the (abstract) speciﬁcation and the (concrete) realization are related
by a preorder on models, the reﬁnement relation. Compared to the speciﬁcation, the realization may be more
deterministic (process reﬁnement), work on different data types (data reﬁnement), or replace atomic actions by
sequences of “more primitive” actions (action reﬁnement). This process terminates with a completely reﬁned
model, the implementation, which is supposed to be easily transformable to a conventional program with equiv-
alent semantics. In the present article, we consider a combination of process reﬁnement and reﬁnement of the
communicated data, which we call behavior reﬁnement.
A reﬁnement relation should preserve the essential properties of the speciﬁcation, be a preorder, and be com-
positional. Development by stepwise reﬁnement only makes sense if the reﬁnement relation is a preorder, i.e., it
is reﬂexive and transitive. If a reﬁnement relation is compositional, then all contexts are monotonic functions
with respect to the reﬁnement preorder. This means that sub-speciﬁcations can be reﬁned to implementations
independently of each other, because replacing a sub-speciﬁcation by a realization in the context of a model
yields a realization of that model.
Starting with Hoare [14], there is a vast body of research (e.g. [15–18]) investigating reﬁnement relations that
preserve functional properties such as deadlock freedom or the observational behavior of an abstract data type.
The preservation theorems for those reﬁnement relations are universal in the following sense: they guarantee that
any realization reﬁning a given speciﬁcation has the same (suitably rephrased) properties as the speciﬁcation.
1.2. Possibilistic information ﬂow under process reﬁnement
A possibilistic information ﬂow property basically requires that, given the true system behavior and the
adversary’s observation of that behavior, there exist one or several alternatively possible system behaviors that
produce the same observation for the adversary as the true system behavior does. Thus, the system keeps the
true behavior secret from the adversary within the set of alternatives, which all produce the same adversary
observation.
It is well known that reﬁnement relations that allow one to reduce nondeterminism [19] do not preserve con-
ﬁdentiality properties. In particular, possibilistic information ﬂow properties of nondeterministic speciﬁcations
are not preserved under process reﬁnement. Roscoe [20] called this the reﬁnement paradox. Several approaches
to deal with this deﬁciency of classical reﬁnement relations have been proposed.
Roscoe et al. [6] avoid the problem by requiring the adversary’s view of the system to be deterministic. This
means that responses of the system to adversary inputs only depend on those inputs and not on information in
the system provided by other sources. Jürjens [21] distinguishes “speciﬁcation nondeterminism” from “imple-
mentation nondeterminism”. He disallows speciﬁcation nondeterminism whenever it inﬂuences the validity of
a security property. Mantel [22] shows how reﬁnement operators tailored for speciﬁc possibilistic information
ﬂow properties can modify an intended realization such that the resulting realization preserves the desired ﬂow
property. Ryan and Schneider [8] discuss the effects of nondeterminism on information ﬂow properties in depth.
They conceptually distinguish “high nondeterminism” and “system nondeterminism” to show where nonde-
terminism may inﬂuence information ﬂow. That distinction reﬂects the distinction between nondeterminism
for speciﬁcation purposes and the kind of nondeterminism induced by probabilistic choices at run-time. The
distinction between high and system nondeterminism reﬂects the speciﬁers’ goal. Apparently, it is hard to reﬂect
that difference semantically. To our knowledge, there is no established formalism that semantically distinguishes
those kinds of nondeterminism and proposes a suitable reﬁnement relation.
1.3. Probabilistic information ﬂow in nondeterministic systems
Probabilistic information ﬂow properties take the stochastic behavior of systems into account. Thus, they
more closely reﬂect the probabilistic nature of information in Shannon’s sense than possibilistic properties do.
They not only require alternative possible system behaviors to be possible, but they also require that the rela-
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tive probabilities of those behaviors satisfy certain constraints. They thus make it sufﬁciently unlikely for the
adversary to guess the true system behavior on the basis of his or her observations of the system. Possibilistic
properties disregard the stochastics of a system. Thus, they implicitly assume that all behaviors producing the
same observation for the adversary are equiprobable.
Furthermore, probabilistic properties can be adapted more easily than possibilistic ones because they require
bounds on a stochastic measure, which quantiﬁes information content or information ﬂow. This facilitates ﬁnd-
ing a compromise between idealized conﬁdentiality requirements (“no information ﬂow”) and other kinds of
requirements.
Nondeterminism is an important means of avoiding premature design bias in a speciﬁcation. Moreover,
certain modeling operators, such as hiding, introduce nondeterminism. Unless one considerably restricts the
modeling language, it is hard to avoid nondeterministic speciﬁcations.
In short, we need to consider nondeterministic models, because we are interested in the chain of models from
an abstract speciﬁcation to a concrete implementation. Probabilistic properties, however, cannot be directly
assigned to a nondeterministic system model, because the stochastics of nondeterministic choice are unknown.
The same is true for models containing external choice, which is resolved by the environment of the model.
These observations raise the question under which conditions a nondeterministic model satisﬁes a probabi-
listic information ﬂow property. The answer we propose is twofold.
First, following Zave and Jackson [23], we consider a system to consist of a machine in its environment.
The machine is to be implemented, whereas the environment models assumptions on the working conditions
of the machine. In an adversary model, the environment consists of a model of the honest users and a model
of the adversary. This allows one to model systems whose security depends on assumptions on user and adver-
sary behavior, and thus to make these assumptions explicit. This system model is an extension of the one we
proposed before [24,25]. It has some similarity with the one proposed by Backes et al. [26], which we discuss in
Section 10.
Second, to obtain a deterministic, probabilisticmodel, for whichwe can determine the validity of a probabilis-
tic information ﬂow property, we consider the realizations of the system components under process reﬁnement.
Designers can inﬂuence how nondeterminism in the machine is resolved. Therefore, it is sufﬁcient to require that
there exists at least one deterministic machine realization that is secure. Nondeterminism in the environment
model, in contrast, expresses lack of information about the environment behavior. Therefore, all possibilities
of resolving nondeterminism in the environment need to be considered when determining the security of the
system: we must require that the chosen machine realization satisﬁes the desired information ﬂow property if
composed with any deterministic realization of the environment. We call those compositions of machine and
environment realizations variants of the adversary model.
In summary, a conﬁdentiality property within the framework of CPR is existentially quantiﬁed over machine
realizations and universally quantiﬁed over environment realizations. The composition of machine and envi-
ronment realizations must satisfy a desired (probabilistic) information ﬂow property, the basic conﬁdentiality
property. There is no single basic conﬁdentiality property that is adequate in all contexts, but the choice of a par-
ticular basic conﬁdentiality property depends on the conﬁdentiality requirement that the property is supposed
to formalize.
1.4. Probabilistic information ﬂow under behavior reﬁnement
Given that a conﬁdentiality property is an existential proposition, the framework of CPR determines the
conditions under which a behavior reﬁnement of an adversary model preserves the existence of a variant that
satisﬁes a given basic conﬁdentiality property.
A behavior reﬁnement reduces nondeterminism and changes the types of communicated data. Behavior
reﬁnement considered as a relation on adversary models may additionally introduce new means of observation
for the “concrete” adversary. The more detailed description of data in the realization may give rise to new
possibilities for the adversary to observe the system behavior.
A conﬁdentiality property expressed in terms of the speciﬁcation model cannot directly be applied to the
realization model, because it cannot interpret the reﬁned data and the new adversary observations. Section 8.3
discusses this additional source of complexity. It introduces “reﬁned” versions of conﬁdentiality properties that
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interpret models in terms of a point of reference. In a succession of several reﬁnement steps, the point of reference
is the most abstract model, in terms of which the required conﬁdentiality property is expressed.
The deﬁnition of CPR in the framework is parameterized by an information ﬂow reﬁnement order that relates
variants of abstract and concrete adversary models, and that preserves the given basic conﬁdentiality property.
Conﬁdentiality-preserving reﬁnement preserves the (existential) conﬁdentiality property on adversary models.
If the information ﬂow reﬁnement order is a preorder, then CPR also is one.
To investigate probabilistic information ﬂow under reﬁnement, we instantiate our framework with a speciﬁc
probabilistic information ﬂow property and establish a suitable information ﬂow reﬁnement order. In Section 7,
we deﬁne a probabilistic information ﬂow property based on the entropy of system behaviors, given an adversary
observation.
To establish an information ﬂow reﬁnement order for that property, we must investigate whether an adver-
sary can obtain more information in a realization variant than in a variant of the speciﬁcation. In general, this
is true, because in the realization, the adversary has additional means of observing the system. The informa-
tion ﬂow reﬁnement order we deﬁne in Section 9 restricts the mutual information between system behavior at
the speciﬁcation level and adversary observations at the realization level, given adversary observations at the
speciﬁcation level. If that mutual information is zero and the speciﬁcation variant satisﬁes the probabilistic
information ﬂow property, then the realization variant also does. Section 9.1 establishes that the condition on
mutual information is reﬂexive and transitive, which immediately implies that the information ﬂow reﬁnement
order is a preorder (Corollary 40).
The main Theorem 44 of the present paper shows that the instantiation of the CPR framework with that
information ﬂow reﬁnement order indeed provides a reﬁnement relation that preserves the probabilistic conﬁ-
dentiality property.
1.5. Overview
The following Section 2 brieﬂy recalls the main deﬁnitions of information theory.
Section 3 presents the process calculus of Probabilistic Communicating Sequential Processes (PCSP) [27],
which extends classical CSP with a probabilistic choice operator. We use PCSP as the basis of our theory.
Section 4 introduces the system model distinguishing machine, honest users, and adversary. PCSP processes
describe the behavior of the constituents of a system and their communication.
Section 5 shows how to determine the probabilities of process behaviors for a certain class of processes, which
is a prerequisite to analyze the security of a system in terms of information theory.
The general structure of conﬁdentiality properties within the framework of CPR is the topic of Section 6.
Two speciﬁc conﬁdentiality properties are deﬁned in Section 7: a possibilistic and a probabilistic one. Those
properties are prototypical for a range of known information ﬂow properties.
The abstract framework of CPR is described in Section 8. Section 9 establishes the information-theoretic
results to instantiate that framework. The instantiation yields a reﬁnement relation that preserves the probabi-
listic conﬁdentiality property of Section 7.
Section 10 puts the concepts and results presented before in the context of the state of the art. Section 11
summarizes the contributions of the present article.
Appendix A summarizes the CSP notation.
The proofs of all theorems can be obtained upon request from the author.
Remark 1. We use the syntax of the speciﬁcation language Z [28] to denote sets and formulas. The set {x :
X |P(x) • f(x)} comprises all f(x) where x ∈ X and P(x) holds. The universal quantiﬁcation ∀x : X |P(x) • Q(x) is
true if for all x ∈ X with P(x) the propositionQ(x) is true. Similarly, ∃x : X |P(x) • Q(x) is true if there exists x ∈ X
with P(x) such that Q(x) is true.
2. Information theory
This section recalls the basic deﬁnitions of information theory, as established by Shannon [2]. We need those
concepts to deﬁne probabilistic conﬁdentiality properties in Section 7 and information ﬂow conditions pre-
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serving those properties in Section 9. Here, we only touch upon the basic facts without much motivation or
justiﬁcation. For a comprehensive introduction to modern information theory, refer, e.g., to MacKay [29].
An ensemble X is a triple (x,AX ,PX ), where the outcome x is the value of a random variable, which takes on
one of a set of possible values,AX = {x1, . . . , xn}, with probabilitiesPX (xi) = pi ∈ [0, 1], such that Pr(X = xi) = pi
and
∑n
i=1 pi = 1. Usually, we write just X to mean the ensemble, the random variable, or the set AX of possible
values of x.
Given two (in general dependent) random variables X and Y , the joint ensemble ((x, y),AX ×AY ,PX ,Y )
describes the experiment of choosing x and y simultaneously. We write X , Y for that ensemble and the corre-
sponding random variable, and we write Pr(X = x, Y = y) for the joint probability of the outcome (x, y).
Given a random variable X , the information content in the probabilistic event that X assumes the value x
with positive probability Pr(X = x) is the logarithm of the reciprocal of that probability, log2 1Pr(X=x) . Since we
will only use the binary logarithm, we subsequently write log for log2.
The entropy H(X) describes the expected information content of all possible outcomes x ∈ X . We will mostly
be interested in conditional entropy. The entropyH(X |Y = y) of some random variable X given an outcome y of
the random variable Y determines the uncertainty about X that remains after observing y . The entropy H(X |Y)
is the expected uncertainty of X for varying y .
H(X) =
∑
x∈X
Pr(X = x) · log 1
Pr(X = x)
H(X |Y = y) =
∑
x∈X
Pr(X = x|Y = y) · log 1
Pr(X = x|Y = y)
H(X |Y) =
∑
y∈Y
Pr(Y = y) ·
∑
x∈X
Pr(X = x|Y = y) · log 1
Pr(X = x|Y = y)
Entropy is non-negative. It is maximal if X is uniformly distributed. Then H(X) = log |X |. The entropy of X
is zero if there is x0 ∈ X with PX (x0) = 1.
Themutual information I(X ; Y) determines the amount of information that Y reveals about X (and vice versa).
It measures the information ﬂow between X and Y . As for the entropy, there are conditional variants of mutual
information given a third random variable Z .
I(X ; Y) =
∑
x∈X ;y∈Y
Pr(X = x, Y = y) · log Pr(X = x, Y = y)
Pr(X = x)Pr(Y = y) (1)
I(X ; Y |Z = z) =
∑
x∈X ;y∈Y
Pr(X = x, Y = y|Z = z) · log Pr(X = x, Y = y|Z = z)
Pr(X = x|Z = z)Pr(Y = y|Z = z) (2)
I(X ; Y |Z) =
∑
x∈X ;y∈Y ;z∈Z
Pr(X = x, Y = y ,Z = z) · log Pr(X = x, Y = y|Z = z)
Pr(X = x|Z = z)Pr(Y = y|Z = z) (3)
Fact 2
(1) Mutual information is non-negative: I(X ; Y) ≥ 0.
(2) Two random variables X and Y are independent iff I(X ; Y) = 0.
(3) Mutual information is symmetric.
I(X ; Y) = I(Y ;X) I(X ; Y |Z) = I(Y ;X |Z)
(4) Mutual information can be expressed in terms of entropy.
I(X ; Y) = H(X)− H(X |Y) I(X ; Y |Z) = H(X |Z)− H(X |Y ,Z)
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(5) Chain Rule for mutual information: Let X1, . . . ,Xn, Y be random variables.
I(X1, . . . ,Xn; Y) =
n∑
i=1
I(Xi , . . . ,Xn; Y |X1, . . . ,Xi−1) (4)
In Section 9, we need to exploit the fact that two random variables X and Z are independent given knowledge
about a third one, Y . This is true if Y provides at least as much information about Z as X does, and therefore
knowledge about X does not contribute to determining Z . That kind of independence is captured by the concept
of a Markov Chain.
Deﬁnition 3 (Markov Chain). Let X , Y , and Z be random variables. They form a Markov Chain X → Y → Z if
X and Z are independent given Y , i.e., for all x, y , and z:
Pr(X = x, Y = y ,Z = z) = Pr(X = x) · Pr(Y = y|X = x) · Pr(Z = z|Y = y)
The following fact restates the independence of the random variables in a Markov Chain in terms of condi-
tional probabilities.
Fact 4. Let X , Y , and Z be random variables forming a Markov Chain X → Y → Z . Then for all x, y, z with
Pr(X = x, Y = y) > 0:
Pr(Z = z|Y = y) = Pr(Z = z|X = x, Y = y)
There is a close correspondence between Markov Chains and the conditional mutual information between
the involved random variables: there is no information ﬂow from the ﬁrst to the last random variable in a
Markov Chain, and all information from the ﬁrst to the last variable ﬂows through the intermediate random
variable.
Fact 5. Let X , Y , and Z be random variables.
(1) X → Y → Z is a Markov Chain iff I(X ;Z |Y) = 0
(2) If X → Y → Z is a Markov Chain then
I(X ;Z) ≤ I(X ; Y) (5)
I(X ;Z) ≤ I(Y ;Z) (6)
3. Probabilistic communicating sequential processes
To formally model the systems we reason about, we use the probabilistic extension PCSP of the process alge-
bra CSP [30,18], which Morgan et al. [27] have proposed. We use PCSP because it integrates probabilistic choice
with nondeterministic and external choice, and its semantics, in particular the semantics of probabilistic choice,
is built upon the concept of reﬁnement. This supports well our investigation of the relationship of reﬁnement
and probabilistic information ﬂow.
Appendix A summarizes the PCSP notation we use.
3.1. CSP
A process P produces sequences of events, called traces. An event c.d consists of a channel name c and a data
item d . Two processes can synchronize on a channel c by transmitting the same data d over c. If one process
generates an event c.d and the other generates an event c.x, where x is a variable, both processes exchange data
when synchronizing on channel c: the value of x becomes d . The notations c?d for an incoming event and c!d
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for an outgoing event indicate the intended direction of a communication. The semantics of CSP, however, does
not distinguish input from output: both, c?d and c!d , are semantically equal to c.d .
The set of traces of P is traces(P). It is closed under preﬁxing. The length of a trace t is #t. The set traces(P) ↓ k
consists of the traces of P with a length less than or equal to k .
The process e → P ﬁrst generates event e, and behaves like P afterwards. The process P |[X ]|Q is a parallel
composition of P and Q synchronized on the channels in X : if a process generates an event on a channel in X ,
it waits until the other process also generates an event on the same channel; if the data transmitted by both
processes are equal (or can be uniﬁed because an event contains a variable), then the parallel composition gen-
erates that event, otherwise the parallel composition deadlocks. As long as P or Q produce events not in X they
proceed asynchronously.
The composition P ‖X Q asynchronously transmits data from P to Q and synchronizes the processes on the
remaining channels, such that the behavior of Q on X cannot inﬂuence P . The deﬁnition of P ‖X Q involves a
buffering process that collects events from P on X and forwards them to Q while blocking any ﬂow of events
from Q to P through X .
In the notion of reﬁnement we use, we are interested in changing data representations of the communicated
data (I/O reﬁnement), because many effects compromising conﬁdentiality can be described by distinguishing
data representations in an implementation that represent the same abstract data item (e.g., different represen-
tations of the same natural number). For a relation R on data, the process1 P [[R]]D is the process P where each
data item a in events of P is replaced by a data item b that is in relation with a, i.e., a R b holds.
The process P\X is distinguished from P by hiding the channels in X . The traces of P\X are the traces of P
where all events over channels in X are removed. Similarly, the process P X is P restricted to the channels in X .
The external choice P 
 Q is the process that behaves like either P or Q, depending on the event that the
environment offers. For a family of processes P(x), the processwP(x) nondeterministically behaves like one of
the P(x). The process P 
 Q nondeterministically behaves like P or like Q.
There are several reﬁnement relations for standard CSP. Most commonly, one uses the failures/divergences
reﬁnement. Informally, the process Q reﬁnes the process P , written P  Q, if Q is more deterministic and less
diverging than P . In particular, any trace of Q also is a trace of P . For details, see Roscoe [18].
For n ∈ N, the ﬁnite approximation P ↓ n of P behaves like P for the ﬁrst n events and diverges afterwards.
Any process P is characterized by its ﬁnite approximations. It is their least upper bound with respect to the
reﬁnement order: P =⊔ n : N • P ↓ n. A process F that diverges after n events is called a ﬁnite process.
The cone P ↑ of a process P is the set of all reﬁnements of P :
P ↑= {Q : CSP |P  Q} (7)
Example 6. The following serves as a running example throughout the paper.
Consider the scoring system of a bank, which they use to determine the credit-worthiness of account holders.
Upon each transfer between accounts, the system determines a new score for the debited account based on some
unknown criteria.
Fig. 1 shows a CSP model of the scoring system. The setHOLDER of account holders comprises three people,
alice, bob, and yves. For simplicity, we identify account holders with their accounts. A SCORE is either good or
poor, and the RESULT of a transfer is ok or error.
The process System0 is the parallel composition of the processes Bank0 and Customers0, which synchronize
on the channel tr.
The process Bank0 models the behavior of the scoring system. Initially, it nondeterministically chooses scores
for the three account holders to initialize the state of the process Transfer0, which contains the scores of all
account holders. The process Transfer0 obtains a transfer from channel tr. The events on tr abstract from the
transferred amount and just specify the debited (from) and the credited (to) accounts. How the result res and
the new score ns are determined, is left unspeciﬁed: they are chosen nondeterministically, and written to the
channels score and result, respectively. The function trans0(state, from, ns) produces a new state from the input
parameter state by updating the score of the account from to the score ns. With the resulting state, the process
Transfer0 recurs.
1 The subscript D indicates that this variant of relational renaming does not change the channel names but only the communicated data.
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Fig. 1. Abstract account scoring system of a bank.
Similarly, the environment process Customers0 nondeterministically generates transfers between accounts on
the channel tr.
The process System0 has the channels tr, score, and result. Its traces consist of sequences of triples of events
like 〈tr.f.t, score.s, result.r〉:
traces(System0) = {〈tr.fi.ti , score.si , result.ri〉∗i }
We use the notation s∗ii to denote any ﬁnite concatenation of sequences s1  . . . sn.
3.2. Probabilistic CSP
Morgan et al. [27] extend standard CSP by a probabilistic choice operator: The process Pp⊕ Q behaves like
P with a probability of p , and it behaves like Q with a probability of 1 − p . This view of probabilistic processes
does not appeal to the intuition that a process chooses a particular behavior probabilistically. It rather empha-
sizes that a probabilistic process behaves like a standard CSP process with a certain probability. Although it
may seem unfamiliar at ﬁrst sight, this view leads to a smooth integration of probabilistic choice with the other
operators of CSP, in particular with nondeterministic choice.
The semantics of PCSP relies on continuous evaluations over a Scott topology of the inductive partial order-
ing (CSP ,). We can only present the essential concepts relevant to our work here. Morgan et al. [27] present
the full theory.
Informally, a probabilistic process P is a function mapping a “Scott-open” set Y of classical CSP processes
to the probability that P behaves like a member of Y . A set Y of processes is Scott-open if, ﬁrst, for any of its
members it contains all processes reﬁning it, and second, for any chain of reﬁnements of processes whose limit
is in Y already a member of that chain is in Y . These conditions guarantee that Y is a complete set of “similar”
processes. The set of probabilistic processes PCSP is the set of continuous evaluations mapping Scott-open sets
of standard CSP processes to [0, 1].
Let P and Q be probabilistic processes in PCSP . The process Q reﬁnes P iff for all Scott-open Y ⊆ CSP , the
probability of Q behaving like Y is at least as high as the probability of P behaving like Y : P(Y) ≤ Q(Y). Since
standard CSP processes can be embedded in PCSP and the reﬁnement orders coincide, we write P  Q for PCSP
reﬁnement, too.
For a ﬁnite standard CSP process F and a probabilistic process P , we write F ˜ P for the probability that Pis a member of F ↑, which is the probability that P reﬁnes F . If P  Q then it also holds for all ﬁnite F ∈ CSP
that F ˜ P ≤ F ˜ Q.For processes P ,Q in PCSP , and p ∈ [0, 1], the probabilistic choice P andQ is deﬁned for all Scott-open subsets
Y of CSP as the probability that:
(Pp⊕ Q)(Y) = p · P(Y)+ (1 − p) · Q(Y )
Because the cone of a ﬁnite process is Scott-open, the following relationship between the probability of
reﬁning a ﬁnite process and probabilistic choice holds. For P , Q in PCSP , ﬁnite F in CSP and probability p ,
F ˜ Pp⊕ Q = p · (F ˜ P)+ (1 − p) · (F ˜ Q)
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Fig. 2. Concrete scoring system.
Furthermore, any non-recursive probabilistic process can be expressed as a probabilistic choice of ﬁnitely
many standard processes, because probabilistic choice distributes through all operators of CSP. We use this fact
in Section 3.3.
Note that nondeterministic choice generalizes probabilistic choice (for any probability p) and external choice
in PCSP, whereas probabilistic choice and external choice are not related by reﬁnement.
P 
 Q 
{
Pp⊕ Q
PQ
The indexed probabilistic choice
⊕P
i:I Pi canonically generalizes the binary operator for ﬁnite index sets I :
this process chooses i—and thus Pi—with probability P(i).
A process is deterministic if it (semantically) does not contain nondeterministic choice. A deterministic process
P is fully reﬁned: there is no process Q /= P such that P  Q.
Example 7. The processes in Fig. 2 specify the banking system of Fig. 1 in more detail. An account data item
now contains not only the name of the holder and a score but also the balance of the account. The process Bank1
chooses the initial balances probabilistically, according to the distribution Pb. The function scr determines the
initial scores from the initial balances.
A transfer event on channel tr now also contains the amount to transfer. When a transfer is initiated by an
event tr.from.to.amount, the process Transfer1 chooses a new score for from according to the distribution Ps
from a set of possible scores, which the function Scores determines from the current state of the account and
the transferred amount. The idea is that Scores implements an algorithm to determine possible scores, whereas
the probabilistic choice models how the bank takes other “soft” criteria into account to determine scores.
The chosen score ns is published on the channel score, but the score of the debited account is only updated
to ns if the transfer is admissible (determined by the predicate adm1) and is actually carried out (by the function
trans1 that yields the updated state). In that case, qualitative information about the amount ofmoney transferred
is published on the channel mi: the function size returns the value small or large.
If the transfer is not admissible, e.g., because the balance of the account to debit is too low, then only the
negative result of the transfer is published on the channel result.
The environment process Consumers1 behaves similarly to Consumers0. In addition to the accounts involved,
it also chooses the amount to transfer nondeterministically.
222 T. Santen / Information and Computation 206 (2008) 213–249
3.3. Probabilistic linear processes
We consider probabilistic conﬁdentiality properties that refer to the probability of a process QE performing
a trace t. Thus we interpret the process QE as a random variable on traces. This is possible only if QE is deter-
ministic, does not admit external choice, and if the length of the considered traces of QE is bounded by some
natural number k . The latter is necessary to distinguish a trace t from a preﬁx s of t if QE may block after s.
Then s and t refer to different probabilistic events.
To resolve nondeterministic and external choices, we consider the set P of all maximal reﬁnements of P .
The membersQ of P are probabilistic deterministic, i.e., they are free of nondeterminism, but they may contain
external choices. The latter are resolved by means of an environment process E that probabilistically resolves
external choices of Q and thus serves as a scheduler [31,32]. Let X be a set of channels. We call a process E an
admissible environment if Q ‖X E is deterministic and does not contain any external choices. For an admissible
environment E, the k-approximation (Q ‖X E) ↓ k is probabilistic linear, i.e., there is a probability function PE
such that
(Q ‖X E) ↓ k =⊕PEt∈traces(Q)↓k Fink(t)
where Fink(t) is the process producing the ﬁrst k events of t and diverging afterwards. If the length of t is less
than k then Fink(t) deadlocks after t.
4. System model
Security, and conﬁdentiality in particular, is a system-wide property, which depends not only on the behavior
of the implemented IT system but also on the behavior of the environment in which the system works. There-
fore, we consider a system to consist of a machine in its environment [23]. The environment model must express
assumptions on the behavior of the users and the adversary. Accordingly, a systemmodel consists of three PCSP
processes, as shown in Fig. 3: the machine P , the (honest) user environment H , and the adversary environment
A. The machine synchronizes with the adversary via the channels in the (functional) adversary interface AI .
Additionally, the adversary can observe the machine on the channels in the monitoring interface MI , and it can
interact with the honest users on the environment interface EI . The sets of channels AI , EI , andMI partition the
channels of A. The union of the adversary interfaces W = AI ∪ EI ∪MI is the adversary window.
An adversary model (P ,A,H ,HI ,AI ,MI ,EI , k) additionally determines a bound k on the length of system
traces that are to be considered. That bound models the maximal time that the adversary spends on observing
the system before drawing conclusions from the observation.
The set EEI ,WP ,k (H ,A) comprises all deterministic probabilistic realizations of the environment processH |[EI ]|A
that are admissible for P (cf. Section 3.3). A proposition about the probabilistic behavior of an adversary model
must therefore consider the probabilistic linear processes (Q ‖MI E) ↓ k where Q ∈ P and E ∈ EEI ,WP ,k (H ,A).
Fig. 3. A system consists of a machine and its environment.
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Those processes (process-) reﬁne the system in its environment, and we call them the variants of the adversary
model:
∀Q : P;E : EEI ,WP ,k (H ,A) • P ‖MI (H |[EI ]|A)  Q ‖MI E (8)
An adversary model captures a model of the machine to be built together with assumptions on the behavior
of the honest users and an adversary. The interfaces AI and EI allow the adversary to actively inﬂuence the
machine and the honest users (permitting active attacks on the users). The user environment can also allow an
adversary to compromise users during a system run.
The concept of indistinguishable traces is the foundation for deﬁning conﬁdentiality properties of adversary
models. Given a set of channels W , two traces s, t ∈ traces(P) of a process P are indistinguishable by W (denoted
s ≡W t) if their projections to W are equal:
s ≡W t ⇐⇒ sW = tW (9)
where sW is the projection of s to the sequence of events on W .
Indistinguishability induces a partition on the trace set of a process. We are particularly interested in the
traces up to the length of k . The indistinguishability class J P ,kW (o) contains the traces of P with a length of at most
k that produce the observation o onW . The set ObskW (P) comprises all observations that P produces with traces
consisting of at most k events.
J
QE,k
W (o) = {t : traces(QE) | tW = o ∧ #t ≤ k} (10)
ObskW (QE) = {t : traces(QE) | #t ≤ k • tW } (11)
Given an observation o, the adversary does not immediately knowwhichmember of J P ,kW (o) caused the obser-
vation (unless that set is a singleton). In their work on possibilistic information ﬂow properties [5], Zakinthinos
and Lee call indistinguishability classes the low level equivalence sets of a speciﬁcation.
Example 8. An adversary model AM0 for Yves in the abstract scoring system of Fig. 1 consists of the machine
modelBank0, the environmentmodelCustomers0, theadversary interfaceAI0 = {tr.yves, tr.alice.yves, tr.bob.yves},
and themonitoring interfaceMI0 = {result}. The environment interface betweenYves and the honest users Alice
and Bob is empty.
The deﬁnition of Customers0 does not directly reﬂect the distinction between honest users and adversary. It
is possible to provide an equivalent but slightly more elaborate process deﬁnition which makes this distinction
explicit. For brevity, we do not present such a process deﬁnition here. We also take a liberal view on the distinc-
tion between channels and events in the “dotted” notation: Yves has access to all transfer events on tr where
his account is debited (tr.yves) or where his account is credited (tr.alice.yves, tr.bob.yves).
The adversary window for Yves is W0 = {tr.yves, tr.alice.yves, tr.bob.yves, result}. An observation on W0 is a
sequence of either event-pairs 〈tr.f.t, result.r〉, where Yves is involved in the transfer (as f or t) and r is the result
of the transfer, or events on result, for transfers in which Yves is not involved. Thus, Yves directly observes the
results of transfers in which he is not involved, and (obviously) observes his own actions and their results. Yves
cannot directly observe any scores, neither his own nor Alice’s or Bob’s scores.
To keep the example manageable, we restrict the length of considered traces to k0 = 3.
5. Probabilistic linear processes as random variables
Probabilistic conﬁdentiality properties of adversary models consider the stochastic behavior of processes in
terms of traces. This is possible only for probabilistic linear processes, because they choose all events proba-
bilistically. For a probabilistic linear process QE = (Q ‖W E) ↓ k , the probability PE(t) is Fink(t) ˜ QE. Theprobability of QE producing exactly the ﬁrst min{k , #t} events of t therefore is
PrkQE(t) = (Fink(t) ˜ QE) (12)
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5.1. Probability of an observation
Let o ∈ ObskW (QE) be an observation of QE on the adversary window W . Because we restricted the length of
the members of JQE,kW (o) to k , this implies that QE produces exactly o when watched for k steps. Therefore, the
probability of the observation o in k steps on the adversary window W , PrW ,kQE (o), is given by
PrW ,kQE (o) =
∑
t∈JQE,kW (o)
PrkQE(t) (13)
Eq. (13) deﬁnes PrW ,kQE (o) in terms of the members of J
QE,k
W (o). It is also possible to express Pr
W ,k
QE (o) as a single
probability of reﬁnement that regards only the events on the adversary window W . To achieve this, we need to
embed QE into a context that restricts the visible events to the ones on W , and that also restricts the number of
events of the original QE to at most k . Counting those events achieves the latter, while the former amounts to
hiding the events on all channels but the members of W . The process term [QE]kW = (QE ‖ Step(k)) W puts QE
in a suitable context, where the process Step(k) counts up to k arbitrary events and deadlocks afterwards.
[QE]kW =
⊕PT
t∈traces(QE)↓k ((Fink(t) ‖ Step(k))W ) (14)
A reﬁnement relationship between ﬁnite processes characterizes the fact that a trace is an observation of
another trace: for all t ∈ traces(QE) ↓ k and traces o on W with #o ≤ k , the following equivalence holds:
o = tW ⇐⇒ Fink(o)  [Fink(t)]kW (15)
Therefore, we can express the probability PrW ,kQE (o) in terms of the probability that the standard processes on
the right-hand side of Eq. (14) reﬁne the process that produces the observation o. The probability PrW ,kQE (o) is
equal to the probability of QE reﬁning the k-ﬁnite process for o on W while producing at most k events.
PrW ,kQE (o) = Fink(o) ˜ [QE]kW (16)
5.2. Posterior probability
We now deﬁne the conditional probability of a trace t given an observation o. The joint probability of a trace
t and its corresponding observation tW is equal to the probability of t.
Pr(t, o) =
{
Pr(t) if o = tW
0.0 otherwise
(17)
Therefore, the conditional probability PrW ,kQE (t|o) of a trace t given the observation o can be expressed in terms
of QE reﬁning linear processes producing t and o.
PrW ,kQE (t|o) =
{
Fink (t) ˜ QEFink (o) ˜ [QE]
k
W
if t ∈ JQE,kW (o)
0.0 otherwise
(18)
Finally, we extend the deﬁnition (12) of the probability of a trace to the probability of a set T of traces.
PrkQE(T) =
∑
t∈T
PrkQE(t) (19)
Similarly, we deﬁne the conditional probabilities PrW ,kQE (T |o), PrkQE(T |T ′), and PrW ,kQE (T |o, T ′) given an obser-
vation o or a set of traces T ′ in terms of the posterior probability (18) of a trace.
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5.3. Entropy of a process
The results we established in this section allow us to consider probabilistic linear processes as random vari-
ables over k-bounded traces. We let our notation reﬂect the correspondence between processes and random
variables, and call the entropy of the set of traces of a process QE up to the length k the entropy H(QE, k) of
that process. Similarly, we deﬁne the entropy of a process given a particular observation, or given arbitrary
observations.
H(QE, k) =
∑
t∈traces(QE)↓k
PrkQE(t) · log
1
PrkQE(t)
(20)
H((QE, k)|W = o) =
∑
t∈traces(QE)↓k
PrW ,kQE (t|o) · log
1
PrW ,kQE (t|o)
(21)
H((QE, k)|W) =
∑
o∈ObskW (QE)
∑
t∈JQE,kW (o)
PrkQE(t) · log
1
PrW ,kQE (t|o)
(22)
Eq. (22) holds because of Eq. (17) for the joint probability of a trace and the corresponding observation. (The
second sum ranges over the indistinguishability class of o only.)
6. Conﬁdentiality properties
This section discusses a common abstraction of the conﬁdentiality properties of adversary models. In par-
ticular, it motivates the existential nature of those properties. The following Section 7 introduces a possibilistic
and a probabilistic property, which are instances of the abstraction deﬁned in the present section.
6.1. Basic conﬁdentiality properties
In earlier work [33], we have discussed several conﬁdentiality properties based on indistinguishability. Pos-
sibilistic conﬁdentiality properties, such as the various information ﬂow properties that Mantel [9] analyzes,
basically require at least one alternative indistinguishable behavior to exist for any given one, according to the
system design. They neither distinguish systems with respect to the number of alternative behaviors, nor with
respect to the degree of evidence (in any suitable measure) an adversarymight assign to the alternative behaviors
in question. We are primarily interested in probabilistic conﬁdentiality properties. These deﬁne the “degree of
evidence” of alternative behaviors based on the probabilistic behavior of the system in a given environment.
Therefore, we focus on predicates CP (QE,W , k) depending on a probabilistic linear process QE (a variant of
an adversary model; Eq. (8)), an adversary window W and the length bound k . We call such a property a basic
conﬁdentiality property.
We do not further characterize basic conﬁdentiality properties here. In the following discussion of the struc-
ture of conﬁdentiality properties, a predicate CP (QE,W , k) serves as a placeholder.
6.2. Structure of conﬁdentiality properties
What are the conditions under which an adversary model satisﬁes a conﬁdentiality property based on
CP (QE,W , k)? More precisely, which variants QE of the adversary model must satisfy CP (QE,W , k) in order to
call the adversary model “secure”?
Since it has become known that possibilistic information ﬂow properties are closure properties [9,7], the
observation that reﬁnement does not preserve conﬁdentiality in general is not so surprising anymore: reﬁne-
ment reduces nondeterminism and thus reduces the set of traces of a system. A closure property requires that,
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given a member of a set, certain other items are also members of that set. Therefore, a process reﬁnement, in
general, does not preserve closure properties.
Consequently, we cannot expect all variants QE of a machine in its environment to satisfy a given basic
conﬁdentiality property CP (QE,W , k) with respect to the adversary window W and the trace bound k , unless
we can exclude “speciﬁcation nondeterminism” in the machine model P . However, this is hardly possible in
the current theory of probabilistic (and standard) CSP for two reasons. A technical reason is that hiding and
data renaming almost inevitably introduce nondeterminism. Methodologically, the nondeterministic choice of
CSP has an interpretation as “execution time nondeterminism”, because it is demonic and must be considered
to be resolved “after” all probabilistic and external choices. On the other hand, it is reﬁned by probabilistic and
external choice, as well. Thus, the deﬁnition of CSP reﬁnement clearly considers nondeterminism as a means of
postponing implementation decisions. From a methodological point of view, it is also necessary to allow P to
contain “speciﬁcation nondeterminism”, because P actually is a speciﬁcation and, as such, must provide ways
of abstracting from design decisions, including decisions on how the system chooses alternative behavior.
As we cannot avoid nondeterministic adversary models but also cannot expect all variants of an adversary
model to satisfy a basic conﬁdentiality property, we take an optimistic view on the development of the machine
andapessimistic viewon the behavior of the environment. The implementationof themachinemodel is under the
control of the developers. They can inﬂuence the way nondeterminism is resolved by design decisions. Therefore,
it sufﬁces to ensure that there exists a secure machine reﬁnement. The environment, in contrast to the machine
process, must be considered with all variations that the adversary model permits, because nondeterminism in
the environment model is resolved by the actual environment at run-time. Therefore, all E ∈ EEI ,WP ,k (H ,A) need
to be considered for evaluating the security of a system. In particular, this allows a security analysis to consider
an arbitrary adversary. Taking the chaotic process Chaos as the adversary environment models the most liberal
assumption about the adversary behavior, because Chaos is reﬁned by any other process.
In summary, an adversary model satisﬁes a conﬁdentiality property that is deﬁned in terms of a basic conﬁ-
dentiality property CP if there is a probabilistic linear realization of the machine process that satisﬁes CP in all
admissible environments.
Deﬁnition 9 (Conﬁdentiality Property). Given an adversary model (P ,H ,A,HI , AI ,EI ,MI , k) and a basic conﬁ-
dentiality property CP , a conﬁdentiality property based on CP has the following general form:
∃Q : P • ∀E : EEI ,WP ,k (H ,A) • let QE = (Q ‖MI E) ↓ k • CP (QE,W , k) (23)
Fig. 4 illustrates Deﬁnition 9. The basic conﬁdentiality property CP must hold for at least one probabilistic
deterministic realization Q of the machine model P (at the lower left of the ﬁgure) when it is executed in any
admissible environment in EEI ,WP ,k (H ,A) (at the upper right of the ﬁgure).
The rationale justifying Deﬁnition 9 considers a machine model as an abstraction of the envisaged machine
implementation, which the developers choose carefully so as to avoid insecure implementations. The environ-
ment model, on the other hand, limits the behaviors of honest users and adversaries. The developers have only
limited inﬂuence on the environment. Therefore all possible behavior within the limits that the environment
model sets must be considered in a security evaluation.
Deﬁnition 9 avoids the reﬁnement paradox, because it explicitly states that not necessarily all functionally
correct realizations are supposed to be secure but that at least one realization needs to exist that is. It also avoids
the misconception that a system will be secure in any working environment but makes the admissible working
conditions and the constraints on the behavior of adversaries explicit.
Remark 10. Other “non-functional” requirements have a similar “existential” nature: To be adequate for a sys-
tem with real-time performance requirements, for example, a model must admit a high-performing implementa-
tion, but not all functionally correct implementations of the model necessarily satisfy the real-time constraints.
7. Possibilistic and probabilistic conﬁdentiality properties
It is not always obviouswhat conﬁdentiality property can adequately capture the conﬁdentiality requirements
of a particular system. Apparently, there is no single property that allows speciﬁers to capture all desirable attri-
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Fig. 4. Conﬁdentiality properties are existential on the machine realizations and universal on the environment realizations.
butes of conﬁdentiality that may be relevant for any conceivable system. Therefore, it is important for a formal
model of conﬁdentiality to allow speciﬁers to express different kinds of conﬁdentiality properties within the same
framework. We deﬁne two conﬁdentiality properties, which are prototypical for possibilistic and probabilistic
properties. Their relation to other properties published before is discussed in Section 10.
(1) The possibilistic property of concealed behavior considers differences between traces to be kept conﬁdential
if they are not directly distinguishable by different observations.
(2) The probabilistic property of ensured entropy builds on information theory. It relates conﬁdentiality to the
uncertainty about the true system behavior that remains after observing the system through the adversary
window.
The concept of indistinguishable behavior is the foundation of those deﬁnitions: a conﬁdentiality property
needs to refer to the indistinguishability relation that an adversary model induces. However, being a property
that an adversary model may or may not satisfy, a conﬁdentiality property must relate the indistinguishability
that the adversary model induces to the required indistinguishability of system behaviors that reﬂects the conﬁ-
dentiality requirement in question. We use the concept of a mask to express the required indistinguishability of
system behaviors.
Deﬁnition 11 (Mask). A mask M for an adversary model (P ,H ,A,HI ,AI ,EI ,MI , k) is a set of subsets of the
traces over the alphabets of P ,H , and A such that the members of each set are indistinguishable by the adversary
window W = AI ∪ EI ∪MI :
∀M : M; t1, t2 : M • t1 ≡W t2 (24)
A mask need not partition the set of system traces. Indeed,
⋃M may contain traces that the system process
cannot produce, and the system process may produce traces not in the mask. The idea motivating the deﬁnition
of a mask is that the adversary model is required to conceal the differences between the members of a set in
M to the extent speciﬁed by a speciﬁc conﬁdentiality property. There is no conﬁdentiality requirement for the
traces of the system process that are not contained in
⋃M. These traces are “don’t cares.”
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Example 12. Consider the following conﬁdentiality requirement for the adversary model AM0 of Example 8.
R1: “Yves does not learn Alice’s or Bob’s scores.”
If Yves observes the single event result.ok on W0, then he knows that exactly one transfer between Alice and
Bob has taken place and was successful. All traces of the form
t0(f , t, s) = 〈tr.f.t, score.s, result.ok〉
where f and t are alice or bob, produce the observation result.ok for Yves.
According to Requirement R1, this observation should not allow Yves to infer Alice’s or Bob’s scores. From
the deﬁnition of the process Transfer0, Yves knows that s is the new score of f if System0 performs t0(f , t, s). A
mask M0 supporting R1 consequently needs to require that for a given f all variations of s in the parameters of
t0 are possible causes of the observation result.ok . Therefore, the sets
M0 = {t0(alice, bob, good), t0(alice, bob, poor)}
M1 = {t0(bob, alice, good), t0(bob, alice, poor)}
should be members of M0.
Taking M0 ∪M1 as a single member of M0 would additionally require that Yves cannot distinguish the
direction of the transfer. This would be a requirement stronger than R1.
The mask should contain similar sets for the other observations Yves can make.
7.1. Concealed behavior
The conﬁdentiality property of concealing a mask M directly relates to the set-theoretic properties of indis-
tinguishability. If an adversary model is to keep conﬁdential the differences between the traces in a setM ∈ M,
then those traces must—at least—be indistinguishable by its adversary window. The following Deﬁnition 14
formalizes that property by set inclusion: M ⊆ JQE,kW (o), where the process QE is a variant of the adversary
model.
The preceding set inclusion requires the system to be capable of producing all members of M . Because the
members M ∈ M of the mask are not required to produce the same observation, this inclusion will not hold
for allM ∈ M and all indistinguishability classes JQE,kW (o) of the adversary model. Therefore, we require that a
member of M is either completely contained in an indistinguishability class or not at all. We say that the set of
indistinguishability classes I covers M.
Deﬁnition 13 (Coverage). Let M and I be two sets of sets of traces. Then I covers M, written IM, if ∀M :
M; I : I •M ∩ I = ∅ ∨M ⊆ I .
The conﬁdentiality property of concealed behavior requires that an adversary model can cover a given mask,
i.e., there is a machine implementationQ such that the indistinguishability classes of all variants of the adversary
model derived from Q cover the mask.
Deﬁnition 14 (Concealed Behavior).The adversarymodel (P ,H ,A,HI ,AI ,EI ,MI , k) conceals themaskM, written
ConcealsM(P ,H ,A,HI ,AI ,EI ,MI , k), if
∃Q : P • ∀E : EEI ,WP ,k (H ,A) • let QE = (Q ‖MI E) ↓ k •
{o : ObskW (QE) • JQE,kW (o)}(M ↓ k)
Depending on the mask that is to be covered, concealed behavior can be used to formalize a wide
range of conﬁdentiality requirements. The strength of the requirement that a mask imposes depends on
the fraction of the unobservable traces traces(P\W) that each member of the mask contains. It also depends on
the fraction of observations the mask addresses at all.
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In one extreme case, eachM contains all possible sequences of unobservable events, i.e.,M\W = traces(P\W),
and the observations covered are all possible observations, i.e.,
⋃
M :MMW = ObskW (P). Then the observations
on W must be completely independent of the unobservable behavior of the system.
In the other extreme, the mask does not restrict the system behavior at all because the members of M are
singletons or because they are associated with observations that the system does not produce.
In the general case, concealed behavior does not prevent information ﬂow from themachine to the adversary:
the distinction between observations on the adversary window, in general, allows the adversary to restrict the
possible behavior that caused a particular observation: the adversary can exclude all behavior that does not
produce that observation, and can thus infer information about the unobservable workings of the system.
Example 15. To determine whether the adversary model AM0 conceals the mask M0, we need to ﬁnd a deter-
ministic machine realization Bank10 of Bank0 such that its composition with all realizations of the environment
process Customers0 covers M0.
For Bank10, we choose the implementation of Bank0 that resolves all nondeterministic choices of Bank0 by
probabilistic choices with equal probabilities for all alternatives.
The admissible environments comprise realizations of Customers0 that produce only one particular sequence
of transfers, e.g., only transfers from Alice to Bob, and also realizations of Customers0 that probabilistically
choose the accounts to debit and to credit.
The members M0 and M1 of M0 are covered by the indistinguishability classes of all resulting variants of
System0, because Bank10 chooses the score of Alice (or Bob) independently of the transfers that the environment
initiates.
The union M0 ∪M1, however, is not covered by all variants, because the variant whose environment process
deterministically produces only transfers from Alice to Bob performs the traces in M0 but not the ones in M1.
This means that with this environment given, Yves can infer who transfers money to whom.
7.2. Ensured entropy
Possibilistic information ﬂow properties require certain system traces to exist that produce the same obser-
vation as a given one, but they do not consider the probability of the system to actually produce one of those
traces. If adversaries know something about the relative probabilities of indistinguishable traces, then a par-
ticular observation o may tell them more than just the fact that the system performs some member JQE,kW (o).
The adversary’s uncertainty about the true system behavior that remains given an observation o varies with
the relative probabilities of the members of JQE,kW (o). The conditional entropy is a measure of the adversary’s
uncertainty about the true system behavior given an observation o. Since entropy is a probabilistic concept, it
is clear that it is well-deﬁned only on the variants of an adversary model.
Deﬁnition 16 (Entropy of a Variant Given an Observation). Let (P ,H ,A,HI ,AI , EI ,MI , k) be an adversary model,
E ∈ EEI ,WP ,k (H ,A) be an admissible environment, QE = (Q ‖MI E) ↓ k be a variant of the adversary model, and
o ∈ ObskW (QE) be an observation on W . The entropy of the variant QE given the observation o is the conditional
entropy H((QE, k)|W = o) as deﬁned in Eq. (21).
The entropy H((QE, k)|W = o) of a variant QE is maximal if all t ∈ JQE,kW (o) have the same posterior proba-
bility; then H((QE, k)|W = o) = log
(∣∣∣JQE,kW (o)∣∣∣). In this case, the only information about the system behavior
ﬂowing to the adversary is that some member of JQE,kW (o) caused the observation o, but there is no reason to
prefer any of them over the others, and probabilistic reasoning does not provide more insight for the adversary
than possibilistic reasoning does.
On the other hand, if H((QE, k)|W = o) = 0, then there is a trace t0 ∈ JQE,kW (o) with PrW ,kQE (t0|o) = 1. In this
case, the observation o actually tells the adversary for sure that the process P performed t0.
In summary, the entropy of a variant QE given an observation o measures the degree to which the variant
keeps conﬁdential the differences between the members of JQE,kW (o): the higher that entropy, the better the var-
iant hides the differences of those behaviors; the smaller the entropy, the more probabilistic reasoning makes a
difference for the adversary in drawing conclusions from an observation.
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Deﬁnition 16 does not take the relative probabilities of observations into account. Those, however, are also
important to evaluate the degree to which a system keeps certain information conﬁdential. The entropy of a
variant given any observation is the mean of the entropies given an observation. It thus takes the distribution
of observations into account.
Deﬁnition 17 (Entropy of a Variant). Let (P ,H ,A,HI ,AI ,EI ,MI , k) be an adversary model, E ∈ EEI ,WP ,k (H ,A) be
an admissible environment, QE = (Q ‖MI E) ↓ k be a variant of the adversary model. The entropy of the variant
QE is the conditional entropy H((QE, k)|W) as deﬁned in Eq. (22).
Turning the concept of entropy into a probabilistic conﬁdentiality property, the property of ensured entropy
takes both measures, the entropy of a variant and the entropy of a variant given an observation into account.
It imposes lower bounds on the entropy of the indistinguishability classes that cover the member sets of a mask
M, and on the entropy of a variant as well. If an adversary model also conceals the given mask M, it thus
guarantees a prescribed degree of uncertainty for an observing adversary.
Instantiating Deﬁnition 9, we obtain an entropy-based conﬁdentiality property: we say that an adversary
model ensures the entropy speciﬁed for the classes of a mask M, if there is a maximal reﬁnement of the system
process such that the entropy of all variants obtained by putting that maximal reﬁnement in an admissible
environment is bounded from below by the entropy associated with the members of the mask M. Additionally,
we require the entropy of all those variants to be bounded from below as well.
None of these conditions is redundant. The restrictions on the entropy of a variant given an observation
allow one to distinguish conﬁdentiality requirements for individual indistinguishability classes whose expected
entropy is equal (because the associated observations are equally probable or because their entropies are equal).
Technically, a total function mapping the members of M to non-negative real values speciﬁes lower bounds
on the entropy of the classes in M.
Deﬁnition 18 (Ensured Entropy). Let H map classes of the mask M and the entire mask as well to possi-
ble values of entropy. The adversary model (P ,H ,A,HI ,AI , EI ,MI , k) ensures the entropy H for M, written
EntHM(P ,H ,A,HI ,AI ,EI ,MI , k), if
∃Q : P •∀E : EEI ,WP ,k (H ,A) • let QE = (Q ‖MI E) ↓ k •({o : ObskW (QE) • JQE,kW (o)}(M ↓ k) ∧
H(M) ≤ H((QE, k)|W) ∧
∀M : M • ∀o : ObskW (QE)|M ↓ k ⊆ JQE,kW (o) •
H(M) ≤ H((QE, k)|W = o))
Example 19. The set M0 ∪M1 is the largest set of traces that a variant of AM0 can produce for the observation
〈result.ok〉. The maximally possible entropy of this set is H01 = log 4 = 2. Therefore, it is sensible to choose
entropy bounds forM0 andM1 in the range of 0 to 4. Requiring H(M0) = 0 means that we do not care whether
Yves can probabilistically infer Alice’s score from the observation 〈result.ok〉, whereas H(M1) = 4 means that
Bob’s and Alice’s scores must all be equally probable, i.e., Yves must neither be able to infer who transfers
money to whom nor be able to determine the score of the debited account.
As the example shows, Deﬁnition 18 admits a wide range of entropy bounds. The value assigned to H(M)
may even be greater than the maximal entropy possible for M . In this case, H requires the containing indis-
tinguishability classes to be larger than M , i.e. it would require the system to produce additional “camouﬂage”
behavior with the same observations as the ones in M .
The entropy of an indistinguishability class depends on the cardinality of that class. To model conﬁdentiality
requirements adequately it is instrumental to come up with an adversary model at the right level of abstraction:
one that distinguishes the important information by different model elements but that—to the extent possible—
does not introduce distinctions that are unnecessary to express the required conﬁdentiality property. Those
additional distinctions may well be unavoidable in an implementation. Sections 8 and 9 show how to introduce
those distinctions into a model while preserving the conﬁdentiality properties of the original one.
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8. Conﬁdentiality preserving reﬁnement (CPR)
This section introduces the framework of conﬁdentiality preserving reﬁnement. We investigate the condi-
tions under which a conﬁdentiality property (Deﬁnition 9) is preserved under behavior reﬁnement of adversary
models.
In Section 8.1, we deﬁne behavior reﬁnement of adversarymodels. The reﬁnement relation determineswhether
a “concrete” adversary model is a functionally correct realization of an “abstract” adversary model. The con-
crete model may be more deterministic than the abstract one. It may also reﬁne the data in communication
events.
In a behavior reﬁnement, the concrete adversary window may extend the abstract one. This reﬂects the
fact that an adversary may have different means of accessing and observing the system in a realization than
are captured in the speciﬁcation, because the realization abstracts from less detail of the conceived imple-
mentation than the speciﬁcation does. As a consequence, the interpretation of an adversary model differs
depending on its role in a reﬁnement: as a speciﬁcation, an adversary model reﬂects what an adversary is al-
lowed to observe (and to do); as a realization, an adversary model describes what an adversary can observe (or
do).
In addition to functional correctness, a “secure” reﬁnement relation must ensure that an adversary’s abilities
do not exceed his permissions: if the speciﬁcation satisﬁes a conﬁdentiality property then the realization must
satisfy a similar conﬁdentiality property that is interpreted in terms of the data model of the conﬁdentiality
property of the speciﬁcation.
The framework of CPR reduces this condition to a relation on behaviorally matching variants of adversary
models. Section 8.2 introduces a re-abstraction preorder on the variants of the speciﬁcation and the realization
adversary models that relates those variants that are in the behavior reﬁnement relation.
Section 8.3 introduces reﬁned conﬁdentiality properties. These are interpretations of a property of an adversary
model in terms of other adversary models.
The conﬁdentiality preserving reﬁnement relation we introduce in Section 8.5 determines an abstract condi-
tion to preserve a conﬁdentiality property: it requires that the re-abstraction preorder coincides with another
preorder on variants of adversary models, the information ﬂow reﬁnement order. The latter is deﬁned in Sec-
tion 8.4. It depends on the conﬁdentiality property in question and ensures that this property is preserved on
variants.
Thus, the framework of CPR reduces the question whether a conﬁdentiality property is preserved by a behav-
ior reﬁnement of adversary models to the question whether the property is preserved by behaviorally matching,
i.e., re-abstracted, variants of the adversary models.
An instantiation of the framework for a particular conﬁdentiality property must provide an information ﬂow
reﬁnement order that is appropriate for that property. Section 9 presents one for ensured entropy (Deﬁnition
18).
In the following,weassume thatA = (Pa,Ha,Aa,HIa,AIa,MIa,EIa, ka)andC = (Pc,Hc,Ac,HIc,AIc,MIc,EIc, kc)
are adversary models.
8.1. Behavior reﬁnement
Allowing the reﬁning process to communicate different data than the reﬁned process, behavior reﬁnement
generalizes PCSP reﬁnement. Of course, the change of data must not be completely arbitrary but there must be
a relation between the concrete and the abstract data that is compatible to PCSP reﬁnement. A retrieve relation
R [17] maps the data of the concrete process Q to the data of the abstract process P , i.e., it is total on the data of
Q, and its range is in the data of P .
A retrieve relation R abstracts away the additional detail of the concrete data to “retrieve” the abstract data
that the concrete data implements. The following deﬁnition of behavior reﬁnement uses a retrieve relation to
abstract the data of the reﬁning process before comparing that “data abstracted” process to the reﬁned process
with PCSP reﬁnement. With data renaming, we have a CSP operator at hand to perform the data abstraction.
Deﬁnition 20 (Behavior Reﬁnement). Let P and Q be probabilistic processes. Let R be a retrieve relation from Q
to P . Then Q behaviorally reﬁnes P via R (written P R Q), if P  Q[[R]]D.
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Behavior reﬁnement allows Q to resolve nondeterminism in P (as usual either by external or by probabilistic
choice). Additionally, it offers new implementation freedom for Q if R maps several data items ci,ki of Q to the
same abstract data item ai of P . In particular, if P offers a probabilistic choice between several e1.ai and e2.aj , then
the reﬁnement condition P  Q[[R]]D requires Q to produce e1.ci,ki and e2.cj,kj for some ki and kj with the same
distribution as P , but it does not prescribe the choice of the ki and kj , whichQmay choose nondeterministically.
Extending behavior reﬁnement to adversary models, there are two points to clarify: ﬁrst, how can the rela-
tionship between system process and environment change in a reﬁnement; and second, how do the adversary
windows relate?
A central objective of our investigation on conﬁdentiality preserving reﬁnement is to clarify the conditions
under which the adversary’s observational power may change securely under reﬁnement. Deﬁnition 21 allows
the reﬁning adversary model to extend the adversary window, i.e., it requires Wa ⊆ Wc. The additional channels
in Wc give the adversary means of observing the system that are not present in the abstract adversary model.
The behavior reﬁnement does not relate those means of observation to the abstract model, which the deﬁnition
reﬂects by hiding Wc − Wa. Thus it allows the adversary to make arbitrary additional observations. In the rest
of this section, we address the question whether those additional observations compromise the security of the
system.
Deﬁnition 21 (Behavior Reﬁnement of Adversary Models). LetA and C be two adversary models. The realization
C behaviorally reﬁnes the speciﬁcation A via the retrieve relation Rca (written A Rca C) if Wa ⊆ Wc and
Pa ‖MIa (Ha|[EIa]|Aa) Rca (Pc ‖MIc (Hc|[EIc]|Ac))\(Wc − Wa)
Example 22. An adversary model AM1 for Yves consists of the processes deﬁned in Fig. 2. Compared to AM0, the
monitoring interface of this model includes channelmi in addition to result. The adversary window of AM1 is the
one of AM0 extended bymi. To accommodate the events onmi, we consider system traces with a length of k1 = 4.
The data on channel tr of AM1 contains the transferred amount, which is not mentioned in AM0. The retrieve
relation R10 establishes a relation between the data communicated in AM1 and AM0: it discards the amount a in
a transfer event.
R01 = {f , t : HOLDER; a : BALANCE • (f.t.a, f.t)}
With R01 , we can prove the behavior reﬁnement on processes
System0 R01 System1\{mi}
This establishes that AM1 is a behavior reﬁnement of AM0. (Note that even if AM0 was deterministic, AM1 could
nondeterministically choose the amounts transferred on tr. In this way, behavior reﬁnement can introduce
nondeterminism.)
To reﬁne a speciﬁcation to an implementation in a stepwise fashion, any reﬁnement relation must be a preor-
der, i.e., be reﬂexive and transitive for an appropriate choice of retrieve relations. Behavior reﬁnement inherits
these properties from PCSP reﬁnement, i.e., A id A and A Rba B ∧ B Rcb C ⇒ A Rcbo9Rba C hold.
8.2. Re-abstraction
Basic conﬁdentiality properties refer to the variants of adversary models, and CPR must place conditions on
the “matching” variants of the speciﬁcation and the realization in order to ensure preservation of the property.
Re-abstraction relates the variants of the speciﬁcation to the “data abstracted” variants of the realization. By
deﬁnition, variants are probabilistic linear (before diverging after k events). This means that a variant of the
speciﬁcation cannot be reﬁned further (up to k). Data renaming a variant of the realization, however, may
introduce nondeterminism. Therefore, there may be several “matching” variants of the speciﬁcation for a given
variant of the realization. These are exactly the ones that the re-abstraction selects.
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Deﬁnition 23 (Re-Abstracted Reﬁnement). Let Rca be a retrieve relation from the data of QEc to the data of
QEa. Let Wa and Wc be sets of channels of QEa and QEc, respectively, such that Wa ⊆ Wc. Then the re-abstracted
reﬁnement of (QEc,Wc) by (QEa,Wa), denoted (QEa,Wa) ↖Rca (QEc,Wc), is deﬁned by
(QEa,Wa) ↖Rca (QEc,Wc) ⇐⇒ QEc\(Wc − Wa)[[Rca]]D  QEa
Similar to behavior reﬁnement, re-abstraction is a preorder.
Example 24. Consider a process reﬁnement Bank20 of Bank0 that chooses all scores probabilistically with the
same probabilities as Bank1 does. The composition BC0 of Bank20 with the process reﬁnement of Customers0
which initiates only transfers from Alice to Bob is a variant of AM0.
Similarly, composing Bank1 with any reﬁnement of Customers1 that initiates only transfers from Alice to
Bob (and chooses the amounts to transfer probabilistically) yields variants BCi1 of AM1, which are re-abstracted
reﬁnements of BC0.
In contrast, all variants of AM0 that choose scores with different probabilities than Bank1 do not have any
re-abstracted reﬁnements in AM1 because a distribution of a particular probabilistic choice cannot change in a
PCSP reﬁnement.
8.3. Reﬁned conﬁdentiality properties
A behavior reﬁnement possibly reﬁnes the data which the processes communicate, and it may also change
the adversary window. A basic conﬁdentiality property CP refers to the data and the adversary window of the
abstract model. To determine whether a reﬁned adversary model satisﬁes the same conﬁdentiality property, it
is in general necessary to relate the concrete data and adversary window back to the abstract ones, to which
CP originally refers. In a sequence of reﬁnement steps, one usually wishes to relate back to the conﬁdentiality
property of the initial speciﬁcation.
To capture this formally, we say that a reﬁned basic conﬁdentiality property CP r(QE,W , k ,Wr ,Rr , kr) refers to
a point of reference consisting of an adversary window Wr , a retrieve relation Rr , and a bound kr . A reﬁned basic
conﬁdentiality property induces a simple one by the following equivalence:
CP (QE,W , k) ⇐⇒ CP r(QE,W , k ,W , id, k)
Fig. 5 illustrates this setting, which considers three levels of abstraction. First, at the top of the ﬁgure, a
point of reference (Wr ,Rr , kr) describes the distinctions between system behavior that an adversary is allowed
to make. The plain represents the set of possible system behaviors at that level of abstraction, and the dotted
line separates indistinguishability classes induced by the adversary window Wr . In a sequence of consecutive
reﬁnement steps, this level would coincide with the most abstract model that constitutes the beginning of the
sequence of reﬁnements.
Second, the abstract adversary model makes up the center row of the ﬁgure. The retrieve relation Rr relates
the system behaviors at this level back to the top level: the abstract trace s1 reﬁnes r1, and s2 reﬁnes r3 of the
point of reference; both, s3 and s4 reﬁne r2.
Third, the bottom level of the ﬁgure shows the concrete model, which the retrieve relation Rca connects to
the abstract model: the concrete traces t1, t2, and t3 all implement the abstract trace s4, and—by transitivity of
behavior reﬁnement—they also implement the trace r2 of the point of reference, i.e., the composition Rcao9Rr
relates them to r2.
8.4. Information ﬂow reﬁnement
Re-abstraction relates the “matching” variants of the abstract and the concrete adversary models. The fol-
lowing concept of information ﬂow reﬁnement serves as an abstraction of the relationship that the matching
variants must satisfy in order to preserve a given conﬁdentiality property.
Deﬁnition 25 (Information Flow Reﬁnement). Let CP r be a reﬁned conﬁdentiality property. A preorder (QEa,Wa)
	ka,kcRca (QEc,Wc) on pairs of probabilistic linear processes and adversary windows is called an information ﬂow
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Fig. 5. Levels of abstraction in a reﬁnement with point of reference.
reﬁnement relation for CP r with the point of reference (Wr ,Rr , kr) if it strengthens the re-abstraction preorder
and is sufﬁcient to preserve CP r , i.e., for all adversary models A and C such that the domain of Rr comprises the
data space of A, and A Rca C holds, the following is satisﬁed:
∀Qa : Pa ;Qc : Pc ;Ea : EEIa,WaPa,ka (Ha,Aa);Ec : E
EIc ,Wc
Pc ,kc
(Hc,Ac) •
let QEa = Qa ‖MIa Ea;QEc = Qc ‖MIc Ec •
((QEa,Wa) 	ka,kcRca (QEc,Wc) ⇒ (QEa,Wa) 
↖
Rca
(QEc,Wc))
∧((QEa,Wa) 	ka,kcRca (QEc,Wc) ∧ CP r(QEa,Wa, ka,Wr ,Rr , kr)
⇒ CP r(QEc,Wc, kc,Wr ,Rcao9Rr , kr))
By deﬁnition, an information ﬂow reﬁnement relation is a subset of the re-abstraction relation. Usually, it
makes sense only for variants that are related by re-abstraction. In the following, we will see that the crucial
condition for conﬁdentiality-preserving reﬁnement requires that the reverse implication is true and the two
preorders coincide on the variants of the adversary models in question.
We postpone a detailed discussion of information ﬂow reﬁnement relations to Section 9, which is devoted to
analyzing an information ﬂow reﬁnement for ensured entropy.
8.5. CPR
Under which condition is a behavioral reﬁnement of adversary models a conﬁdentiality-preserving one?
Because conﬁdentiality properties are existential propositions (Deﬁnition 9), a behavior reﬁnement does not
necessarily admit a secure reﬁnement at all. The realization might exclude all possible secure reﬁnements even
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though the speciﬁcation satisﬁes the conﬁdentiality property, i.e., there is a variant of the speciﬁcation satis-
fying the desired basic conﬁdentiality property. The behavior reﬁnement can only preserve conﬁdentiality if
there is a secure variant Q̂Ea of the speciﬁcation that (PCSP-) reﬁnes the re-abstracted realization. If this is
the case, then we need to know that the re-abstracted variants of the realization matching Q̂Ea are secure, too.
Conﬁdentiality-preserving reﬁnement guarantees this property.
Deﬁnition 26 (Conﬁdentiality-Preserving Reﬁnement, CPR).
Let	 be an information ﬂow reﬁnement relation. The adversarymodel C is a conﬁdentiality-preserving reﬁne-
ment (CPR) of the adversary modelA for	 via the retrieve relation Rca (writtenA 	Rca C) ifA Rca C and the
re-abstracted reﬁnement of variants of A and C is sufﬁcient for their information ﬂow reﬁnement:
∀Qa : Pa ;Qc : Pc ;Ea : EEIa,WaPa,ka (Ha,Aa);Ec : E
EIc ,Wc
Pc ,kc
(Hc,Ac) •
let QEa = Qa ‖MIa Ea;QEc = Qc ‖MIc Ec •
(QEa,Wa) ↖Rca (QEc,Wc) ⇒ (QEa,Wa) 	
ka,kc
Rca
(QEc,Wc)
In conjunction with the ﬁrst implication in Deﬁnition 25, the deﬁnition of CPR implies that (givenA Rca C)
A 	Rca C is equivalent to the identity of information ﬂow reﬁnement and re-abstraction on the variants of A
and C. This means that to prove that a behavior reﬁnement preserves conﬁdentiality, one needs to prove that
any pair of re-abstracted variants is in the information ﬂow reﬁnement relation.
Because information ﬂow reﬁnement is a preorder, CPR also is a well-behaved reﬁnement relation.
Lemma 27 (CPR is a Preorder). For all adversary models A, B, and C, CPR satisﬁes A 	id A and A 
	
Rba
B ∧ B 	Rcb C ⇒ A 
	
Rcb
o
9Rba
C.
Proposition 28 states themost important property of CPR, namely that it does indeed preserve conﬁdentiality
properties (with an appropriately adjusted point of reference). As indicated before, CPR cannot be expected to
allow “secure” reﬁnements only, but it can establish that a behavior reﬁnement whose re-abstraction admits an
“abstractly secure” PCSP reﬁnement preserves that security over data reﬁnement and extension of adversary
windows.
Proposition 28 (CPR preserves CP r). Let CP r be a reﬁned basic conﬁdentiality property with point of reference
(Wr ,Rar , kr). Let	 be an information ﬂow reﬁnement relation for CP r . If A 	Rca C then the following implication
holds: (∃Qa : Pa • ∀Ea : EEIa,WaPa,ka (Ha,Aa) •
((Pc ‖MIc (Hc|[EIc]|Ac))\(Wc − Wa))[[Rca]]D  Qa ‖MIa Ea
∧CP r(Qa ‖MIa Ea,Wa, ka,Wr ,Rar , kr)
)
⇒(∃Qc : Pc • ∀Ec : EEIc ,WcPc ,kc (Hc,Ac) • CP r(Qc ‖MIc Ec,Wc, kc,Wr ,Rcao9Rar , kr))
Remark 29. A careful analysis of the line-up of the quantiﬁers in Proposition 28 suggests that the deﬁnition of
information ﬂow reﬁnement might be too strong. For conﬁdentiality preservation, it sufﬁces indeed to require
alternating universal and existential quantiﬁers like ∀Qa∃Qc∀Ec∃Ea • . . . in Deﬁnition 25. Unfortunately, the
resulting deﬁnition of CPR is not transitive, because the required witnesses for the variant of the intermediate
adversary model need not match.
9. Information ﬂow preserving reﬁnement
Section 8 investigated the preservation of arbitrary conﬁdentiality properties under behavior reﬁnement. The
main result is that the preservation of a basic conﬁdentiality property from abstract to concrete
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Fig. 6. Random Variables in a Reﬁnement.
variants—established by an information ﬂow reﬁnement relation—is sufﬁcient to preserve the corresponding
general conﬁdentiality property under behavior reﬁnement of adversary models.
We now aim at establishing an information ﬂow reﬁnement relation for the conﬁdentiality property of
ensured entropy. To this end, we analyze the amount of new information an adversary may obtain from a
reﬁned adversary model. We consider the variants of the abstract and concrete adversary models as random
variables producing system traces. From these, random variables on observations are derivable. We argue that
the mutual information between the abstract system traces and the concrete observations, given an abstract
observation, is a suitable measure for the additional information an adversary gains by observing the concrete
rather than the abstract system. We describe the relevant random variables and the information ﬂow condition
in Section 9.1. Section 9.2 turns that condition into a preorder on pairs of random variables. Section 9.3 applies
these information-theoretic results to variants of adversary models and derives a condition that preserves the
conﬁdentiality property of ensured entropy in a reﬁnement.
9.1. Mutual information in a reﬁnement
Consider a variant QEa of an adversary model that is a re-abstraction of a variant QEc of another adversary
model for the adversarywindowsWa andWc via the retrieve relationRca: (QEa,Wa) ↖Rca (QEc,Wc). Furthermore,
assume that the re-abstraction does not introduce nondeterminism, such that QEa is equal to the re-abstracted
version of QEc:
QEa = (QEc\(Wc − Wa))[[Rca]]D (25)
As discussed in Section 5.3, being a probabilistic linear process, a variant of an adversary model can be asso-
ciated with random variables describing the way the variant chooses to perform a certain trace or to produce a
certain observation. For QEa and QEc, we introduce the following random variables, whose dependencies Fig.
6 illustrates.
X = r The variant QEa produces the trace r ∈ Traces(QEa) ↓ ka.
U = oa The variant QEa produces the observation oa ∈ ObskaWa(QEa).
Z = t The variant QEc produces the trace t ∈ Traces(QEc) ↓ kc.
W = oc The variant QEc produces the observation oc ∈ ObskcWc(QEc).
The interpretation of adversary models depends on their role in a reﬁnement: the abstract model describes
what an adversary may observe or do, whereas the concrete model describes what an adversary can observe
or do. Consequently, a secure reﬁnement is one that does not allow an adversary to observe or do more than
the abstract model allows the adversary to observe or do. For conﬁdentiality, this means that the concrete
observations do not provide more information about the abstract behavior than the abstract observations do.
Example 30. The variants BC0 and BCi1 of AM0 and AM1, respectively, satisfy Eq. (25), because (BC
i
1\{mi})[[R01 ]]D
are deterministic for all i: abstracting from the amounts in transfer events does not introduce nondeterminism.
Examples for the traces mentioned in Fig. 6 are:
r = 〈tr.alice.bob, score.poor, result.ok〉
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oa = 〈result.ok〉
t = 〈tr.alice.bob.100, score.poor, result.ok ,mi.alice.bob〉
oc = 〈result.ok ,mi.large〉
The question now is, how much more information Yves gains about Alice’s score by observing oc than by oa,
i.e., what does the event mi.large tell about Alice’s score that the event result.ok would not reveal already?
Our task now is to ﬁnd an information-theoretic measure for the information that an adversary may gain by
observingQEc throughWc about the behavior ofQEa in addition to the information the adversary gains through
Wa. In this setting, the two processes QEc and QEa must be considered models—which are abstractions—of the
same system executing, because we wish to analyze the amount of information each model provides about the
system behavior. This assumption is justiﬁed, because QEc is a re-abstracted reﬁnement of QEa, which means
that the retrieve relation Rca couples the behaviors of the two models.
In terms of the random variables of Fig. 6, we consider the following experiment: the concrete variant pro-
duces the system trace t (Z = t), and the adversary observes oc at the concrete windowWc (W = oc). Because the
twomodels describe the same systembehavior, the abstractmodel produces a trace r (X = r) with observation oa
(U = oa) such that r is an abstraction of t by the retrieve relation Rca. Assuming that the abstract model produces
the observation oa constrains the values of the other random variables. This assumption is justiﬁed, because
the adversary may know the abstract observations—and may draw conclusions from them. In particular, the
adversary may link abstract to concrete observations. Then the question is, given the observation oa, how much
does the observation oc tell an adversary about the abstract system behavior r? In terms of information theory,
this amounts to analyzing the ﬂow of information from X to W given U = oa.
The conditional mutual information I(X ;W |U = oa) is a measure for that information ﬂow. If it is positive
then the adversary gains more information from the concrete observations than from the abstract observations.
Conversely, the reﬁning variant QEc does not allow the adversary to gain more information about the abstract
system behavior than QEa if there is no ﬂow from X to W given U = oa, i.e., I(X ;W |U = oa) = 0 for all oa.
Since the mutual information is non-negative, this condition is equivalent to considering the expected mutual
information given U and requiring
I(X ;W |U) = 0 (26)
Eq. (26) is equivalent to requiring that X → U → W is a Markov Chain.
Example 31. In the example, we need to analyze themutual information from the traces of BC0 to the new obser-
vations on channelmi, given the abstract observations onW0. If, for a successful transfer (result.ok), Alice’s score
depends on the size of the transferred amount (small or large), then revealing the size to Yves at channel mi
provides him with more information than he receives through the channel result.
Conversely, the additional channel mi in the monitoring interface of BCi1 does not compromise the conﬁden-
tiality of Alice’s and Bob’s scores only if the scores are stochastically independent of the size of the transferred
amounts.
9.2. Mutual information preorder
The following deﬁnition turns Eq. (26) into a preorder on the pairs of random variables.
Deﬁnition 32 (Mutual Information Order). The mutual information order 	 is a relation on pairs of random
variables deﬁned by
(X ,U) 	 (Z ,W) ⇐⇒ I(X ;W |U) = 0
The remainder of this section veriﬁes that	 is a preorder. We ﬁrst establish the transitivity of	, because this
needs some effort. Consider two consecutive reﬁnements and the corresponding random variables as illustrated
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Fig. 7. Random Variables in Two Successive Reﬁnements.
in Fig. 7. Since the random variables X , Y , and Z represent consecutive reﬁnements, and U , V , and W the corre-
sponding observations, we know that, given the state of a process, the corresponding observation is independent
of the states of the other processes and of the other observations. We also know that an observation does not
provide more information than the corresponding system state does. Therefore, the assumptions (27) through
(31) of the following Lemma 33 are valid. They require that certain constellations of the random variables in
Fig. 7 are Markov Chains. Furthermore, given the abstract system state X , the reﬁned observations V and W
are independent of the abstract observation U (assumptions (32) and (33)).
Given all those assumptions, which are direct consequences of the situation the random variables describe,
there is no ﬂow of information from the abstract system state X to the most reﬁned observations W , given the
abstract observations U , if the corresponding conditions independently hold for the two reﬁnement steps. This
is the statement of Lemma 33.
Lemma 33. Let X , Y , U , V , and W be random variables that are related as in Fig. 7. In particular, the following
are Markov Chains:
X → Y → W (27)
U → X → W (28)
V → Y → W (29)
X → Y , V → W (30)
U → Y , V → W (31)
Furthermore, if X is given, then the probabilities of W and V are independent of U .
Pr(W |X) = Pr(W |X ,U) (32)
Pr(V |X) = Pr(V |X ,U) (33)
Under these assumptions, the following implication holds: If
X → U → V (34)
Y → V → W (35)
then
X → U → W (36)
Reﬂexivity of	 follows from the fact that H(X |U ,U) is equal to H(X |U), which justiﬁes:
Corollary 34. The mutual information order	 is a preorder.
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9.3. Reﬁnement preserving ensured entropy
We ﬁnally use the information-theoretic results of the previous section to instantiate the framework of CPR.
This yields a reﬁnement relation on adversary models that preserves ensured entropy. Since concealed behavior
is a necessary condition of ensured entropy, we also show that that reﬁnement relation preserves concealed
behavior.
Weproceed as follows. Sections 9.3.1 and 9.3.2 introduce “reﬁned” versions of concealed behavior and ensured
entropy relative to a point of reference. On that basis, Section 9.3.3 deﬁnes an information ﬂow reﬁnement rela-
tion that is sufﬁcient to preserve ensured entropy.
Throughout this section, we assume that the retrieve relation Rr in the point of reference (Wr ,Rr , kr) is the
graph of a function.
We also assume that C is a behavior reﬁnement of A, A Rca C, and that Wr is a subset of the adversary
windowsWa andWc. We consider two variantsQEa andQEc of the adversary modelsA and C, respectively, such
that (QEa,Wa) ↖Rca (QEc,Wc) and Eq. (25) holds, i.e., that QEa not only reﬁnes the re-abstraction of QEc but is
equal to it.
9.3.1. Reﬁned concealed behavior
For the adversary model A, the point of reference (Wr ,Rr , kr) can be interpreted as describing an anony-
mous adversary model which is reﬁned by A: the point of reference abstracts from certain data in A, and it
distinguishes a subset Wr ⊆ Wa of the adversary window of A.
A reﬁned version of concealed behavior needs to take the point of reference into account in such a way that,
ﬁrst, it considers the traces whose data are abstracted by Rr , and second, it allows the adversary to distinguish
traces through Wr (at the abstract level) and to assume an (abstract) observation or on Wr as given. In Fig. 5,
for example, or could represent the indistinguishability class of r2, i.e., the right half of the plain representing
the traces in the point of reference. This would imply that the adversary can distinguish s1 from s2 because s1
implements r1, whereas s2 implements r3, which the adversary can distinguish from r1. To capture those effects
of a point of reference, we deﬁne a version J [[Rr]]WrWa of a set of traces J that is abstracted to the point of ref-
erence (Wr ,Rr , kr). Because Rr is the graph of a function and Wr is a subset of Wa, the members of J [[Rr]]WrWa are
indistinguishable by Wr if the members of J are indistinguishable by Wa.
J [[Rr]]WrWa = (J\(Wa − Wr))[[Rr]]D (37)
In the example of Fig. 5, the set JQEa,kaWa (s2Wa)[[Rr]]WrWa is contained in the indistinguishability class of r2,
because s2, s3 and s4 are members of J
QEa,ka
Wa
(s2Wa) and {(s1, r1), (s2, r3), (s3, r2), (s4, r2)} ⊆ Rr .
Eq. (37) allows us to deﬁne a reﬁned version of concealed behavior (cf. Deﬁnition 14). The reﬁned property
requires a variant QE to cover the mask M in terms of the point of reference—because the mask contains traces
at that level of abstraction. To achieve this, the reﬁned basic conﬁdentiality property CP cb(QE,W , k ,Wr ,Rr , kr)
for concealed behavior considers the system of “abstracted” indistinguishability classes of QE.
ĈP cb(QE,W , k ,Wr ,Rr , kr) ⇐⇒
{
o : ObskW (QE) • JQE,kW (o)[[Rr]]WrW
}
(M ↓ kr) (38)
Example 35. InExample 15,we saw thatAM0 concealsM0. TodeterminewhetherAM1 satisﬁes a similar property,
we must re-interpret the traces of AM1 in terms of AM0, i.e., in the point of reference (W0,R01 , k0). For example, it
does not make sense to ask whether 〈tr.alice.bob.42, score.good , result.ok ,mi.small〉 is a member ofM0, because
the type of data communicated over tr does not match and the channel mi is new in AM1. Instead, we need to
check whether the “abstraction” 〈tr.alice.bob, score.good , result.ok〉 is a member of M0.
9.3.2. Reﬁned ensured entropy
Deﬁnition 18 introduced the conﬁdentiality property of ensured entropy, which guarantees that the indistin-
guishability classes that cover the members of a mask have entropies exceeding the lower bounds associated to
those members of the mask. For the reﬁned version of the property, those are bounds on entropies with respect
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to the point of reference, i.e., of data-abstracted traces that are indistinguishable through W (and Wr). In Fig. 5,
the “abstract’ entropy of the indistinguishability class of s3—given some or—would consider the probabilities
of the ri occurring in the abstract model. Thus, {s3, s4} would be one probabilistic event representing r2: the
probability of r2 in the adversary model A is the probability of the event that QEa produces the traces s3 or s4:
Pr(r2) = Pr({s3, s4}) = Pr(s3)+ Pr(s4).
Furthermore, the observations on the adversary window of the point of reference and the abstract adversary
model are assumed to be known to the adversary. In terms of the random variables of Fig. 6, the entropy we
are interested in is H(X |W = o,U = or). The following Eq. (39) presents this entropy for a variant QE of an
adversary model. The conditional entropy H((QE, k ,Wr ,Rr)|W = o, (Wr ,Rr) = Jr) with respect to the point of
reference refers to the probabilities of the traces of QE, where Jr is an indistinguishability class with respect to
Wr that consists of traces in the data range of Rr . Thus, Jr represents an observation or in the point of reference.
H((QE, k ,Wr ,Rr , kr)|W = o, (Wr ,Rr , kr) = Jr) =
let J = {t : JQE,kW (o) | Rr(t\(W − Wr)) ∈ Jr};
T = {t : J • {t′ : J | Rr(t′\(W − Wr)) = Rr(t\(W − Wr))}} •∑
T∈T
(
PrkQE(T |J) · log
1
PrkQE(T |J)
)
(39)
To reﬂect the assumption that both, the observation o and the observation represented by Jr are given, Eq.
(39) constructs the set J of all traces t of QE that produce o on W and that have an abstraction Rr(t\(W − Wr))
in Jr . The set J describes the “given” stochastic event.
The system T partitions J into the sets of traces of QE that represent the same trace in the point of reference.
We are interested in the entropy in the point of reference. Therefore, those traces need to be considered as
one stochastic event, namely that QE produces their common abstraction. Consequently, the entropy is calcu-
lated in terms of the probabilities of the members T of T given J . If Jr = {r|r ≡Wr r2} in Fig. 5, then the class
J = {s2, s3, s4} and the system T =
{{s2}, {s3, s4}}.
The complexity of Eq. (39) is due to references to two levels of abstraction: the point of reference and the
adversary model. The analysis in Section 9.1—with Eq. (26) suitably instantiated—reveals that the entropy
H((QE, k ,Wr ,Rr , kr)|W = o, (Wr ,Rr , kr) = Jr) can be simpliﬁed if the mutual information between the traces of
the point of reference and the observations of the adversary model is zero.
The following Eq. (40) instantiates Eq. (2). It deﬁnes the mutual information I(X ;W |U) (in the terminology
of Fig. 6) in terms of two variants QEa and QEc satisfying Eq. (25). For a given trace r of QEa, and observations
oc and oa, the set T comprises all traces of QEc that contribute to the stochastic event “X = r,W = oc,U = oa.”
The set Oa represents the event “U = oa,” and the indistinguishability class JQEc ,kcWc (oc) represents “W = oc.”
I((QEa, ka); (QEc, kc,Wc)|(QEa, ka,Wa)) =∑
r∈traces(QEa)↓k
∑
oc∈ObskcWc (QEc)
∑
oa∈ObskaWa (QEa)
let T = {t ∈ traces(QEc) ↓ kc| (40)
tWc = oc ∧ r = Rca(t\(Wc − Wa)) ∧ rWa = oa};
Oa = {t ∈ traces(QEc) ↓ kc|oa = Rca(t\(Wc − Wa))Wa} •
PrkcQEc(T) · log
PrkcQEc(T |Oa)
PrWa,kaQEa (r|oa) · PrkcQEc(J
QEc ,kc
Wc
(oc)|Oa)
With Lemma 2, we immediately have the following presentation of the mutual information in Eq. (40) as a
difference of conditional entropies.
I((QEa, ka); (QEc, kc,Wc)|(QEa, ka,Wa))
= H((QEa, ka)|(QEa, ka,Wa)) (41)
−H((QEa, ka)|(QEc, kc,Wc), (QEa, ka,Wa))
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With those preliminaries, we can deﬁne the reﬁned version of ensured entropy. The following condition
directly rephrases the basic conﬁdentiality property of ensured entropy in terms of a point of reference.
ĈP cb(QE,W , k ,Wr ,Rr , kr) ∧
H(M) ≤ H((QE, k ,Wr ,Rr , kr)|W , (Wr ,Rr , kr)) ∧
∀M : M; o : ObskW (QE) • let Jr = JQE,kW (o)[[Rr]]WrW • (42)
M ↓ kr ⊆ Jr ⇒
H(M) ≤ H((QE, k ,Wr ,Rr , kr)|W = o, (Wr ,Rr , kr) = Jr)
The following Deﬁnition 36, however, uses a stronger condition that nevertheless is equivalent to CP ee for the
trivial point of reference. In addition to the Predicate (42), the reﬁned basic property ĈP ee(QE,W , k ,Wr ,Rr , kr)
requires the mutual information between behavior at the point of reference and observations of the variant QE
to be zero. Under that condition, the following equality between entropies holds:
∀M : M; o : ObskW (QE) • let Jr = JQE,kW (o)[[Rr]]WrW •
M ↓ kr ⊆ Jr ⇒ (43)
H((QEr , k)|(QEr , k ,Wr) = Jr)
= H((QE, k ,Wr ,Rr , kr)|W = o, (Wr ,Rr , kr) = Jr)
Eq. (43) justiﬁes to formulate Deﬁnition 36 in terms of the entropy at the point of reference only.
Deﬁnition 36 (Reﬁned Ensured Entropy). LetH : M → R+ map classes ofM to possible values of entropy. The
adversary model (P ,H ,A,HI ,AI ,MI ,EI , k) ensures the entropy H for M with the point of reference (Wr ,Rr , kr), if
Wr ⊆ W , Rr is the graph of a function, and
∃Q : P • ∀E : EEI ,WP ,k (H ,A) • let QE = (Q ‖W E) ↓ k •
ĈP ee(QE,W , k ,Wr ,Rr , kr) (44)
where
ĈP ee(QE,W , k ,Wr ,Rr , kr) ⇐⇒{
o : ObskW (QE) • JQE,kW (o)[[Rr]]WrW
}
(M ↓ kr) ∧(
let QEr = (QE\(W − Wr))[[Rr]]D •
I((QEr , kr); (QE, k ,W)|(QEr , kr ,Wr)) = 0 ∧
H(M) ≤ H((QEr , kr)|(QEr , kr ,Wr)) ∧
∀M : M; o : ObskW (QE) • let Jr = JQE,kW (o)[[Rr]]WrW •M ↓ kr ⊆ Jr ⇒
H(M) ≤ H((QEr , kr)|(QEr , kr ,Wr) = Jr)
)
(45)
Example 37. The elementary stochastic events in reﬁned ensured entropy are the sets of traces in an indistin-
guishability class that “realize” the same trace in the point of reference. Consider the “abstract” trace ta =
〈tr.alice.bob, score.good , result.ok〉 of AM0 (which we interpret as the point of reference for AM1). For the obser-
vation o = 〈result.ok ,mi.small〉 of AM1, all traces of AM1 of the form tN = 〈tr.alice.bob.N , score.good , result.ok ,
mi.small〉 represent the trace ta in the indistinguishability class of o. Therefore, to determine the entropy of the
indistinguishability class of AM1 in the point of reference, we take the probability of ta (in the point of reference)
to be the sum of the probabilities of all tN (in a variant of AM1).
The following lemma shows that ĈP ee(QE,W , k ,W , id, k) indeed is a reﬁned version of the basic conﬁdentiality
property of ensured entropy.
Lemma 38. LetQE be a probabilistic linear process and letW be a set of channels ofQE. Then the reﬁned property
ĈP ee(QE,W , k ,W , id, k) for the point of reference (W , id, k) is equivalent to the basic conﬁdentiality property of
ensured entropy.
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9.3.3. Information ﬂow reﬁnement for ensured entropy
We ﬁnally deﬁne an information ﬂow reﬁnement relation for ensured entropy. The following Deﬁnition 39
specializes the mutual information preorder of Deﬁnition 32 for random variables derived from variants of two
adversary models.
Deﬁnition 39 (Information Flow Reﬁnement Preserving Ensured Entropy). LetQEa andQEc be variants of adver-
sary models such that (QEa,Wa) ↖Rca (QEc,Wc). Then (QEc,Wc) is an information ﬂow reﬁnement of (QEa,Wa)
preserving ensured entropy, written (QEa,Wa) 
ka,kc
Rca
(QEc,Wc) if the following condition holds:
QEa = (QEc\(Wc − Wa))[[Rca]]D ∧
I((QEa, ka); (QEc, kc,Wc)|(QEa, ka,Wa)) = 0 (46)
Corollary 34 immediately implies the following one.
Corollary 40. The relation (QEa,Wa) 
ka,kc
Rca
(QEc,Wc) is a preorder.
The main result of this paper is the following Theorem 44. It states thatka,kcRca preserves the conﬁdentiality
property of ensured entropy. It relies on Proposition 43, which states that ka,kcRca preserves the conﬁdentiality
property of concealed behavior.
The following lemmas are essential to prove Proposition 43. Lemma 41 shows how to determine the condi-
tional probability of an “abstract” trace of QEa in terms of the probability of “concrete” traces of the process
QEc. In particular, it establishes that the set of those concrete traces is non-empty if the corresponding abstract
trace has a positive probability.
Lemma 41. Let (QEa,Wa) 
ka,kc
Rca
(QEc,Wc), and let the abstract observation oa ∈ ObskaWa(QEa) and the concrete
observation oc ∈ ObskcWc(QEc) have a positive joined probability: Pr((QEc, kc,Wc) = oc, (QEa, ka,Wa) = oa) > 0.
Then for all r ∈ traces(QEa):
PrWa,kaQEa (r|oa) =
let T = {t ∈ traces(QEc) ↓ kc|
tWc = oc ∧ r = Rca(t\(Wc − Wa))};
Oac = {t ∈ traces(QEc) ↓ kc|
tWc = oc ∧ oa = Rca(t\(Wc − Wa))Wa} •
PrkcQEc(T |Oac)
Furthermore, if PrWa,kaQEa (r|oa) > 0, then the set T is nonempty.
The following Lemma 42 is needed to show that ka,kcRca preserves the coverage of a mask. It establishes that
each re-abstracted indistinguishability class of QEc is an indistinguishability class of QEa. Because Wa ⊆ Wc,
the abstract observation oa associated with the re-abstracted indistinguishability class is the projection of the
concrete observation oc to Wa. The re-abstracted class contains the complete indistinguishability class of oa,
because Eq. (25) guarantees that the re-abstraction of QEc produces exactly the traces of QEa.
Lemma 42. Let (QEa,Wa) 
ka,kc
Rca
(QEc,Wc). Then
∀oc : ObskcWc(QEc) • J
QEc ,kc
Wc
(oc)[[Rca]]WaWc = J
QEa,ka
Wa
(ocWa)
Proposition 43 establishes that ka,kcRca preserves the reﬁned conﬁdentiality property of concealed behav-
ior. Together with Corollary 40, this means that ka,kcRca is an information ﬂow reﬁnement order for concealed
behavior.
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Proposition 43 (Preservation of Concealed Behavior). Let (Wr ,Rr , kr) be a point of reference for QEa such that
Wr ⊆ Wa and Rr is the graph of a function, and let M be a mask in that point of reference. If (QEa,Wa) ka,kcRca
(QEc,Wc) and ĈP cb(QEa,Wa, ka,Wr ,Rr , kr) then ĈP cb(QEc,Wc, kc,Wr ,Rcao9Rr , kr).
Theorem 44 establishes the main result of this paper, namely thatka,kcRca preserves ensured entropy, and with
Corollary 40, that it is an information ﬂow reﬁnement property for ensured entropy.
Theorem 44 (Preservation of Ensured Entropy). Let (Wr ,Rr , kr) be a point of reference for QEa such that Wr ⊆ Wa
and Rr is the graph of a function, and let M be a mask in that point of reference. If (QEa,Wa) ka,kcRca (QEc,Wc) and
ĈP ee(QEa,Wa, ka,Wr ,Rr , kr) then ĈP ee(QEc,Wc, kc,Wr ,Rca o9 Rr , kr).
With Theorem 44 and Corollary 34, we ﬁnally know that the reﬁnement relation A Rca C is a preorder and
preserves ensured entropy, i.e., it is a secure reﬁnement order on adversary models for the property of ensured
entropy.
Example 45. Example 31 showed that the mutual information between abstract behavior of BC0 and concrete
observations of BCi1 is zero if the scores are determined stochastically independent of the size qualiﬁcation on
mi. Therefore, if BC0 ensures the entropy bounds H for a mask M (Example 19), then Theorem 44 guarantees
that BCi1 also has that property (for a suitable point of reference).
At the level of adversary models, Proposition 28 makes a similar but slightly more complex statement: if the
behavior reﬁnement admits a secure process reﬁnement, then ensured entropy is preserved under the behavior
reﬁnement. The entropy bounds we discussed in Example 19 are only preserved by the reﬁnement, if the proba-
bilistic choices in System1, which are determined by the distributions Pb and Ps, are such that the “abstracted”
behavior (without the amount in transfers and without the events on mi) meets the entropy bounds. Under this
condition, CPR ensures that the new observations (on mi) and the data reﬁnement (on tr) do not compromise
conﬁdentiality.
10. Related work
10.1. Reactive simulatability
The system model introduced Section 4 has some similarities with the system model underlying reactive
simulatability [34,26], which addresses the cryptographically secure implementation of “ideal” cryptographic
protocols by “real” ones using cryptographic algorithms [35]. Both system models explicitly distinguish the ma-
chine, the honest users, and the adversary, all of which can interact through designated communication channels.
Like our adversary window, “forbidden” channels model means of the adversary to which honest users do not
have access. The differences between the two approaches reﬂect the different purposes they are designed to
serve: We aim at a stepwise development of an “ideal” system starting from a very abstract initial speciﬁca-
tion and ending at an implementation model that still abstracts from issues of computational complexity. The
model of Backes, Pﬁtzmann and Waidner, in contrast, is designed to support the last transition from such an
“ideal” implementation model to one that uses “real” algorithms. Therefore, it is asynchronous and determin-
istic. It has a high-resolution step semantics that allows one to analyze computation and communication acts
in a very detailed manner (including their computational complexity). The concept of reactive simulatability
is used to compare an ideal with a real model. It essentially is a strong (probabilistic) bisimulation [31] that
enforces cryptographic indistinguishability (not to be confused with our notion of indistinguishability) of the
honest users’ view of the system, while the adversary can change in the transition from “ideal” to “real”. Thus,
reactive simulatability is very well suited to analyze the question whether an implementation of a cryptographic
protocol is correct. However, it is too restrictive to support stepwise reﬁnement from a very abstract to a much
more detailed system model. In particular, it insists that the user model is the same for both, ideal and real
system.
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10.2. Possibilistic information ﬂow properties
Possibilistic information ﬂow properties require that a system that can perform a certain behavior can also
perform certain other behaviors. Thus, such a property ensures that an observation does not immediately reveal
the system behavior that caused the observation.
Mantel’s thesis [9] presents a comprehensive overview over different types of possibilistic information ﬂow
properties. His Modular Assembly Kit for Security Properties (MAKS) identiﬁes basic properties that can be
conjoined to produce different information ﬂow properties.
Information ﬂow properties like the ones Mantel investigates are usually discussed using examples from the
area of multi-level security. Conﬁdentiality of events should be ensured regarding two types of users which are
named High and Low after their corresponding security levels. User High is assumed to manipulate conﬁdential
information whereas user Low also has access to the system but should not be able to deduce certain types of
conﬁdential information.
The system model on which the deﬁnitions of information ﬂow properties is based describes the possible
traces over a given set of events, which are classiﬁed as inputs, outputs, and internal events. A view partitions
the set of events into conﬁdential, visible, and non-visible events. A basic security predicate is a closure property
requiring certain traces to exist that differ from a given trace essentially in conﬁdential events.
Standard information ﬂow properties such as generalized noninterference [36] and forward correctability [37]
formally capture the intuition that observing only the visible events of a system trace does not allow an adver-
sary to gain information about the conﬁdential events of that system trace. Such properties can be expressed as
conjunctions of basic security predicates in MAKS.
There is a close but not an exact match between the concepts underlying basic security predicates and con-
cealed behavior [33]. The most signiﬁcant difference is the existential quantiﬁcation in basic security predicates.
This requires at least one alternative behavior ′ to be possible instead of a given behavior . If there is more
than one candidate for ′ then any one sufﬁces, and the remaining ones need not be possible system behaviors.
A mask, however, prescribes all required alternatives to a given behavior. If a system produces one behavior in
a member of a mask, it must be able to produce them all. The particular way Deﬁnition 13 deﬁnes coverage is
adequate to deﬁne probabilistic conﬁdentiality properties such as ensured entropy.
Another difference between the standard information ﬂow properties and concealed behavior lies in the
granularity of modeling secrets. A view classiﬁes events as conﬁdential, whereas concealed behavior keeps the
differences between indistinguishable traces conﬁdential. Those differencesmay not only concern the occurrence
or non-occurrence of single events but also the relationship of several events. In Example 12, the requirement
is not to keep scores as such conﬁdential but the scores of account holders, i.e., the relation between an event
tr.from.to and immediately following event score.s. In the context of a development process based on reﬁnement,
it may not always be possible to associate secrets with atomic events.
10.3. Probabilistic noninterference
Gray [38,1] worked out the conditions of probabilistic noninterference for a speciﬁc system model, which
captures sequences of low and high events associated with internal system states. Gray’s [1] condition of prob-
abilistic noninterference requires that for all sequences2 H , L of input events, and all sequences H , L of
output events on high or low channels, respectively, that end at time t − 1, and any low output event lt at time
t, the following condition holds:
Pr(L ∩ L ∩ H ∩ H ) > 0 ⇒ Pr(lt |L ∩ L ∩ H ∩ H ) = Pr(lt |L ∩ L) (47)
Gray [1] shows that Condition (47) implies that the mutual information between the high behavior preceding t
and the low output lt at time t given the low behavior preceding t is zero.
I(H ∩ H ; lt |L ∩ L) = 0 (48)
2 Strictly speaking, H , H , L, and L are sets of sequences of system behaviors with equal inputs or outputs on H or L, respectively.
T. Santen / Information and Computation 206 (2008) 213–249 245
By this equality, the channel capacity from high behavior to low outputs also is zero.
Similar to the possibilistic noninterference properties, the model underlying probabilistic noninterference
does not consider the environment explicitly but models the machine only. The machine model is a probabilistic
deterministic one, and the environment is supposed to resolve all external choices in the machine. Compared
to Deﬁnition 9, probabilistic noninterference considers only a single machine implementation. Condition (47)
quantiﬁes over all possible environment behaviors, which corresponds to the universal quantiﬁcation over envi-
ronment variants in Deﬁnition 9. Similar to the parameter k of an adversary model, Gray [1] considers system
behavior up to a time t, where the sequencing of events models the passing of time. In contrast to our sys-
tem model, Gray’s [1] model distinguishes inputs and outputs. Therefore, the following analysis of the relation
between probabilistic noninterference and ensured entropy refers to amodiﬁed version of Condition (47), which
does not distinguish input and output:
Pr(L ∩ H ) > 0 ⇒ Pr(lt |L ∩ H ) = Pr(lt |L) (49)
where H and L refer to the complete behaviors at the interfaces of High and Low, respectively, and lt is a
low event at time t. In our terminology, H corresponds to a member of an indistinguishability class for the
low behavior L, and L is an observation on the adversary window. The time bound t and the trace bound
k of an adversary model do not match exactly, because Gray [1] assumes that there are high and low events at
each point in time, whereas our system model—following CSP—admits only single events at each place of a
trace.
To capture Condition 49 by ensured entropy, we analyze the entropy of the high behavior given certain low
behaviors. Ensured entropy considers only behaviors up to a given point in time, but it does not relate time t to
the preceding point in time t − 1. To establish that relation nevertheless, we express the entropy of high behavior
given low behavior up to time t in terms of entropies preceding time t.
First, derive an equation for the entropy of H given the low behavior up to time t.
H(H , lt |L) = 〈chainrule〉
H(H |L)+ H(lt |H ,L) (50)
H(H , lt |L) = 〈commutativity, chainrule〉
H(lt |L)+ H(H |L  〈lt〉) (51)
The two equations imply
H(H |L  〈lt〉) = H(H |L)+ H(lt |H ,L)− H(lt |L) (52)
With Eq. (52), we relate the entropy of high behavior up to time t to the entropy up to time t − 1:
H(H
 〈ht〉|L  〈lt〉) (53)
= 〈chainrule〉
H(H |L  〈lt〉)+ H(ht |H ,L  〈lt〉) (54)
= 〈Eq.(52)〉
H(H |L)+ H(lt |H ,L)− H(lt |L)
+ H(ht |H ,L  〈lt〉) (55)
= 〈Lemma2〉
H(H |L)− I(lt;H |L)+ H(ht |H ,L  〈lt〉) (56)
By Eq. (48), the mutual information I(lt;H |L) is zero if and only if Condition (49) is true. By Eq. (56),
this is the case if and only if
H(H
 〈ht〉|L  〈lt〉) = H(H |L)+ H(ht |H ,L  〈lt〉) (57)
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Mutual information always is non-negative. Therefore, H(H  〈ht〉|L  〈lt〉) is maximal if and only if
Condition 49 holds.
In summary,Gray’s [1] conditionof probabilistic noninterference is similar to ensured entropywith an entropy
bound that assigns maximal entropies (according to Eq. (57)) to all indistinguishability classes. To make this
result a formal theorem, it would be necessary to elaborate the relationship between our system model and the
one underlying probabilistic noninterference in detail, but we will not pursue this issue further here.
10.4. Discrete quantiﬁcation of information ﬂow
Lowe [39] quantiﬁes information ﬂow discretely, without referring to probabilities. Thus his work mediates
between a possibilistic yes/no concept of information ﬂow and one based on probabilistic information theory.
Similar to our deﬁnition of a conﬁdentiality property, his information ﬂow property quantiﬁes over the possible
reﬁnements of a speciﬁcation, which are similar to the variants of an adversary model. In contrast to our view,
he uses a pessimistic approximation and considers the worst case, i.e., maximal, ﬂow of information produced
by all variants. Our view is pessimistic with respect to the environment but takes an optimistic view with respect
to the machine.
10.5. Reﬁnement
Most research on the relationship of conﬁdentiality properties and reﬁnement addresses trace reﬁnement and
ways to avoid the reﬁnement paradox. Few researchers discuss the effects of more complex kinds of reﬁnement.
Graham-Cumming and Sanders [40] discuss the preservation of noninterference under data reﬁnement. They
specify systems using the speciﬁcation language Z [28] and deﬁne security as indistinguishability on system traces
with respect to a given user. They give conditions under which a reﬁnement of the internal data of the system
preserves indistinguishability. Their approach is possibilistic, and, in contrast to our setting, they consider only
reﬁnements of the internal state of a system but not of the input and output data. We emphasize reﬁning the
communicated data, because an implementation must be designed in such a way that choosing particular rep-
resentations of inputs and outputs does not allow adversaries to infer more information about the system than
they are allowed to.
Jacob [41,42] compares the conﬁdentiality established by a CSP process relative to a window, which is a set of
events. A system keeps more information conﬁdential than another with respect to a given window if it allows
for more traces given an observation on that window. Based on this concept, Jacob [41, Sect. 3.3, Def. 4] deﬁnes
a security ordering: a system is at least as secure as another if it allows for more traces given any observation
that is a possible observation of both systems. This ordering is similar to the preservation of concealed behavior
in Proposition 43. However, instantiating Lemma 42 for Wa = Wc reveals that our ordering actually is stronger
than Jacob’s [41] security ordering. The relationship (QEa,W) 
k
id (QEc,W) entails that QEc may have fewer
indistinguishability classes than QEa, which is similar to the security ordering, but it also requires that all indis-
tinguishability classes ofQEa that have a counterpart inQEc are preserved completely: in contrast to the security
ordering, kid does not permit the indistinguishability classes of QEc to be larger than the corresponding ones
of QEa. This is a consequence of the fact that QEc is a behavior reﬁnement of QEa and that Wa is completely
contained in Wc. Therefore, indistinguishability classes can only become smaller in a reﬁnement (for the trivial
retrieve relation id).
The contributions of this paper are based on earlier research on conﬁdentiality-preserving reﬁnement [24,25].
The main progress compared to that work is that we now have clariﬁed the relationship between the reﬁnement
relation and the conﬁdentiality property that it preserves: the entire framework is parameterized by the conﬁ-
dentiality property in question whereas the reﬁnement relation of Heisel et al. [24] does not refer to a particular
conﬁdentiality property. Instead, it requires—in our terminology—the concrete model to ensure the maximally
possible entropy of its indistinguishability classes, and that (the inverse of) the retrieve relationmaps an abstract
indistinguishability class either completely to a concrete one or not at all. The latter requirement corresponds
to the possibilistic statement at the end of Lemma 41. Thus, the reﬁnement relation of Heisel et al. [24] is a
special case of ours for ensured entropy. Furthermore, the technical foundations, in particular concerning the
probabilistic behavior of processes, have not been worked out in detail in those earlier publications.
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11. Conclusions
We have established a formal framework for behavior reﬁnement relations between adversary models that
preserve conﬁdentiality properties. Behavior reﬁnement allows the concrete model to communicate different
data on its channels than the abstract model. It also permits the concrete adversary window to allow for more
observation channels than the abstract adversary window. In this way, behavior reﬁnement of adversary models
captures two crucial issues that come up in the transition from an abstractmodel to one that capturesmore detail
of the real world: the particular choice of data type implementations may compromise security, and possibilities
of an adversary to observe the system may become relevant from which the abstract model abstracts.
The concept of an information ﬂow reﬁnement relation is crucial to concisely capture the conditions under
which a behavior reﬁnement preserves a particular conﬁdentiality property. By deﬁnition, an information ﬂow
reﬁnement relation expresses a sufﬁcient condition to preserve a (reﬁned) basic conﬁdentiality property at the
level of variants of adversary models.
The deﬁnition of conﬁdentiality-preserving reﬁnement (CPR) relies on the information ﬂow reﬁnement rela-
tion and makes precise which variants of the two adversary models must be related by information ﬂow reﬁne-
ment in order to preserve the conﬁdentiality property at the level of nondeterministic adversary models. It is
intellectually satisfying to see that the preservation condition of CPR in essence requires the information ﬂow
reﬁnement relation and the re-abstraction relation to coincide.
The framework of CPR suggests a division of labor between security theoreticians and security engineers:
the former are responsible to deﬁne a conﬁdentiality property that is adequate to capture a relevant class of
conﬁdentiality requirements and ﬁnd an information ﬂow reﬁnement relation for it; the latter must establish
the conditions of CPR for each reﬁnement step in a concrete system development.
Furthermore, we have investigated the information ﬂowbetween variants of two adversarymodels in a behav-
ior reﬁnement. Informally, the idea is to allow no more “abstract” distinctions for an adversary who has access
to “concrete” observations than for an adversary who only knows about “abstract” observations. Formally,
the mutual information between “abstract behavior” and “concrete observations” must be zero. Although the
primary purpose of that investigation is to establish general results that allow us to identify conditions for pre-
serving ensured entropy in a reﬁnement, it turns out that the analysis of the information ﬂow between variants
is quite involved. Proving the transitivity of that relation, which is a routine task in many other contexts, relies
on a complex interaction of many facts about the modeling context that make Proposition 33 much more than
a simple lemma on the way of establishing “ensured-entropy-preserving reﬁnement.”
Finally, Theorem 44 is the culmination point of our entire theory. To prove that the deﬁnition of CPR for
ensured entropy indeed preserves that conﬁdentiality property relies on many aspects of the theory that we have
developed before. To deﬁne the information ﬂow reﬁnement relation for ensured entropy, we need to interpret
the random variables for which we abstractly analyzed the mutual information in terms of the PCSP processes
that make up an adversary model. The proof of Theorem 44 combines lemmas about the properties of indis-
tinguishability classes with the general information-theoretic results established before. The theorem justiﬁes
to instantiate the framework for CPR and thus joins all results of this paper to form a single statement about
preserving the probabilistic conﬁdentiality property of ensured entropy under behavior reﬁnement.
To the best of our knowledge, conﬁdentiality-preserving reﬁnement (and its predecessor [24,25]) is the ﬁrst
reﬁnement relation that considers changing data types and adversary windows as well, and that preserves prob-
abilistic conﬁdentiality properties.
Conditions under which CPR is compositional are currently investigated. One cannot expect CPR to be
unconditionally compositional. The task here is to ﬁnd practically relevant sufﬁcient conditions under which
reﬁning a part of a system yields a reﬁnement of the complete system.
Appendix A. CSP notation
Process parameters
Ch channel names
D set of data transmitted over channels
 set of all events over Ch and D,
 = {c.x|c ∈ Ch ∧ x ∈ D}
P set of all channel names used in events of P
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Process constructors
Stop the deadlocked process
Skip the terminating process
div the diverging process
e → P event preﬁxing
P [[S]] (relational) event renaming
P [[R]]D data renaming, P [[R]]D := P [[{(c.a, c.b)|c ∈ Ch ∧ a R b}]]
P\X hiding channels X in P
P X hiding all channels in P but the ones in X
P ;Q sequential composition
P |[X ]|Q parallel composition of P and Q with synchronization over the events on the
channels X
P ‖X Q asynchronous, unidirectional communication from P to Q via channels X
PQ external choice
?x : X → P(x) preﬁx choice
P 
 Q internal choice
wi:I P(i) indexed internal choice
P ↓ k ﬁnite approximation of P diverging after k events
Pp⊕ Q probabilistic choice with probability p of choosing P⊕P
x:X P(x) indexed probabilistic choice
P ↑ the cone of P , i.e., the set of all Q reﬁning P
F ˜ P the probability that P reﬁnes F
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